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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
A HOLY TUG OF WAR: 
US CHRISTIANS AGAINST THE CONTRAS  
(1970-1990) 
 
After the Sandinista revolution of 1979 ousted the longstanding Somoza dynasty 
of Nicaragua, the small Central American nation became an obsession of US foreign 
policy as the Reagan administration committed its efforts to deposing the leftist 
revolutionary government through the funding and training of the Contras, a counter-
revolutionary guerrilla group. With the Cold War at a boiling point, continued control 
and influence over Central America became a pillar of US anticommunist agenda. 
Uniquely, many of the most ardent critics of the Reagan administration during this period 
of violent intervention were Christian missionaries. The Sandinistas were able to defeat 
the Somoza regime in large part due to the support of Nicaraguan clergy who adhered to 
a socially conscious current of Catholicism known as Liberation Theology. US 
missionaries found themselves similarly radicalized by Liberation Theology in a unique 
instance of ideology moving from South to North, and they chose to make Central 
America a pivotal point of their political activism as they opposed US intervention in the 
region. Though this activism faded with the turn of the 1990s, the Christian anti-Contra 
movement presented a unique challenge to the binaries of Cold War politics on a scale 
previously unseen. 
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Introduction to Liberation Theology 
 On November 21, 1985, readers of Wichita’s The Catholic Advance were greeted 
with an anonymous guest editorial, titled “A Disarming Christmas.” Less than disarming, 
the article’s author inveighed against corrupting forces that were invading the homes of 
American families and ruining the sanctity of the holiday in the form of a child’s toy – 
G.I. Joe. “The spirit of Christmas is above all the spirit of peace. It is not the spirit of 
war… on Christmas morning in front of the stable of the Prince of Peace, millions of 
little Christian children will be living in the murderous, hate-filled spirit of enmity that 
Rambo, G.I. Joe, toy machine guns, etc. require them to use. To play homicide, one must 
put on a homicidal mind.” Catholic parents were encouraged to boycott the “homicidal 
fantasies” of G.I. Joe, lest they betray their Christian morals and invite evil into their 
homes.1 The mimicry of war encouraged sin when peace should take priority above all 
else. 
 The guest editorial seemed a non sequitur for the local paper, which concerned 
itself largely with the activities of local youth groups and Catholic schools. It was joined 
by a related article on the same page, “Bishop Sullivan calls for Change in U.S. Policy 
Toward El Salvador,” which told of a Virginia Bishop condemning US support for the 
dictatorial regime that ruled the Central American nation amidst a brutal civil war.2 These 
headlines spoke to a growing movement within US Christendom that reached its peak 
during 1980s – an anti-war and anti-imperialist coalition with a focus on Central America 
that matched the State Department’s growing obsession over the region. While 
 
1 “A Disarming Christmas,” The Catholic Advance (Wichita, KA), Nov. 21, 1985. 
2 “Bishop Sullivan calls for Change in U.S. Policy Toward El Salvador,” The Catholic Advance (Wichita, KA), 
Nov. 21, 1985. 
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originating from a Catholic source, this coalition came to include Protestant 
denominations and even Jewish support that formed an interfaith cross-section of 
American religious organizations all dedicated to opposing US intervention in Latin 
America.  
Scholarship on Christian political movements in the US during this era largely 
focuses on the growing “Moral Majority” – a movement of right-wing evangelicals that 
supported Ronald Reagan in his efforts to shrink the government and fight the Soviet 
Union defined largely by religious fundamentalists. Christian political activists during 
this period are often contrasted to the American left as a large and single bloc, but such 
narratives often leave out the often more contentious nature of Reagan’s relationship with 
Christians as a demographic.3 As the Reagan administration grew more aggressive in its 
foreign policy to maintain US influence over Central American politics during the Cold 
War, a growing group of missionaries, priests, and nuns emerged as some of the principle 
organizers and activists seeking to end US intervention. These protests were not just an 
extension of US partisan politics, but rather an expression of a transnational solidarity 
that emerged from dialogues between US Catholic missionaries and Nicaraguan 
counterparts in the Sandinista revolution prior to Reagan’s campaign of intervention. 
While anticommunism is often taken as the default stance of Christendom, many US 
Christians found themselves protesting on behalf of a socialist government. Interaction 
between Christians in Latin America and the US allowed for ideas of religious activism 
and dissidence to move from the South to the North and created a strong sense of 
 
3 Eric R. Crouse, The Cross and Reagonomics: Conservatives Christians Defending Ronald Reagan (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2013), 7-8. 
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awareness and dissatisfaction with US intervention within the core of US empire. This 
movement represented the impact of a brand of socially conscious Catholicism known as 
Liberation Theology reaching beyond Latin America and extending its influence into the 
United States.  
Historical scholarship on Liberation Theology began primarily in the 1980s, with 
the Nicaraguan Revolution acting as a focal point for much research. According to 
activist-scholar Margaret Randall, the Nicaraguan Revolution remains unique from other 
uprisings of the era as the only major leftist revolution where “Christians as a group 
played a decisive role in all aspects … up to and including armed struggle.”4 With her 
1983 Christians in the Nicaraguan Revolution written only 4 years into the revolutionary 
government’s tenure, Randall’s perspective on Liberation Theology was one of relative 
optimism; she applauded the movement for its ability to “recover the true word of God” 
from those who once used it for oppression. Her work portrayed the role of Liberation 
Theology as a reclamation of faith for the common person and a return to the roots of 
Catholicism before its transformation into a force for colonialism. While not a Christian 
herself, Randall felt that secular activists and revolutionaries had much to learn from the 
successes of Nicaragua’s popular church.5 Her work concludes with a critique of US 
Christendom, with one of her interviewees commenting on how “backward” she found 
the Catholic Church of the US to be, feeling that Nicaragua’s church was well ahead in 
terms of social issues and “very developed” by comparison.6 Randall hoped that US 
 
4 Margaret Randall, Christians in the Nicaraguan Revolution (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1983), 11. 
5 Ibid, 19-20. The popular church as a term refers to clergy and laity within Nicaragua who adhered to 
Liberation Theology and broadly supported the aims of the Sandinista’s revolutionary government. 
6 Cited by Ibid, 202. 
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Christians could someday follow example of Nicaragua, but overall found the popular 
church a phenomenon unique to Latin America. 
Perspectives from the 1990s - after the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas to the 
UNO coalition - were less optimistic about Liberation Theology’s potential for long term 
change. Eric Canin noted that the popular church organizations of Nicaragua commanded 
far less enthusiasm in 1991 than they did two years prior; the fall of the Sandinistas from 
power left them with no sponsor and as a result they quickly came across as “obsolete” as 
their resources dwindled and their allies in the government abandoned them.7 Jean 
Daudelin, professor of International Affairs at Carleton University, was more skeptical 
and postulated that the actual popularity and organizational capacity of Liberation 
Theology was possibly exaggerated from the start. Whatever power he felt the movement 
still had in Latin America was certainly dwindling as the Catholic hierarchy sought to 
“reign it in” as well.8 Some scholars were kinder, still crediting Christian activists in 
Latin America with a major role in the democratization of the late 20th century even if 
they felt Liberation Theology was over-the-hill. Princeton political theorist Paul Sigmund 
noted that “Catholic social thought” in the region took on a much more pluralistic 
character starting in the 1950s and 1960s and that Liberation Theology was important for 
disrupting the church’s prior role as an “authoritarian defender.”9 Sigmund felt that the 
movement had passed though and that the main success of Catholic leftists was primarily 
 
7 Eric Canin, “Work, a Roof, and Bread for the Poor: Managua’s Christian Base Communities in the 
Nicaraguan ‘Revolution from Below’,” Latin American Perspectives 24, no. 2 (1997): 80. 
8 Jean Daudelin and W.E. Hewitt, “Latin American Politics: Exit the Catholic Church?” in Organized Religion 
in the Political Transformation of Latin America, ed. Satya R. Pattnyak (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1995), 177. 
9 Paul Sigmund, “The Transformation of Catholic Social Thought in Latin America: Christian Democracy, 
Liberation Theology, and the New Catholic Right,” in Organized Religion in the Political Transformation of 
Latin America, ed. Satya R. Pattnyak (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), 41. 
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in tempering the rhetoric of their right-wing counterparts. Rather than speak to the goals 
of Liberation Theology, Sigmund speaks more on a democratic consensus that it helped 
foster.10 Liberation Theology itself then comes off as irrelevant in the long term. If the 
movement had become irrelevant in its cradle of Latin America, then it surely was not 
relevant in the US, and these scholars made little reference to any role it may have played 
abroad. 
By the early 21st century some critics went even further than Daudelin and 
denounced Liberation Theology as outright deceitful. In his 2007 book Revolution, 
Revival, and Religious Conflict in Sandinista Nicaragua, religious historian Calvin Smith 
assessed the popular church as not only a failed political project but as an illegitimate 
religious one - a smokescreen through which the Marxist Sandinistas manipulated and 
fooled a well-meaning Christian constituency before ultimately turning their back on 
them.11 By this reading, the relative dissolution of Liberation Theology in the 1990s was 
then a natural extension of the end of the Cold War. If one takes Liberation Theology as a 
Soviet psy-op, then it stands further to reason that it would find no fertile purchase past 
the iron curtain in the US.  
While there has been scholarship on the anti-Contra protest movements of the 
1980s, rarely is this movement deeply connected with antecedents in Latin America; 
either the possible connections are not emphasized, or the protests are viewed as an 
extension of existing partisan struggles. Foreign policy historian Theresa Keeley explores 
the tensions between Catholic antiwar protestors and their conservative rivals at great 
 
10 Ibid, 59-60. 




length in her dissertation “Reagan’s Gun Toting Nuns: Catholicism and U.S. – Central 
America Relations,” but her work mostly focuses on political rivalries within the United 
States. Keeley frames the debates of the 1980s as integral to the shaping of Catholic 
identity in the late 20th century and identifies Liberation Theology as a source of tension, 
but her work does not explore this idea of northward movement in much depth.12 Keeley 
largely frames it as a domestic political struggle, focused on the internal divisions 
between emerging factions of US Catholicism. Alternatively, modern scholarship that 
treats the subject of dissident religious movements uses “liberation theology” as an 
abstract term removed from Medellín or 20th century Catholicism altogether. Liberation 
Theologies in the United States: An Introduction examines many different religious 
organizations and protests movements in the US that arose from a variety of different 
ethnic contexts, many of which predate Liberation Theology as it is traditionally known 
in Latin America.13 Even though the collected essays identify many of these religious 
movements as coming from immigrant contexts, they treat them as domestic concerns as 
they typically arise within the United States’ borders are thoroughly disconnected from 
traditional understandings of Liberation Theology. 
A different reading of sources shows a much stronger connection between the rise 
of leftist religious activism in Latin America and the anti-Contra protests of the 1980s. 
Through the activities of US missionaries in Latin America, the terminology used by 
Christian activists in the US, the stories reported by Christian newspapers and 
 
12 Theresa Keeley, “Reagan’s Gun Toting Nuns: Catholicism and U.S. – Central America Relations,” PhD 
diss., (Northwestern University, 2013), 15-17. 
13 Anthony B. Pinn, “Black Theology,” in Liberation Theologies in the United States: An Introduction, ed. 
Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas and Anthony B. Pinn, (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 15-19.  
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publications, and the heavy-handed response by their conservative rivals it is seen 
Liberation Theology played a strong role in animating Christian protests. The political 
effects of Liberation Theology within the United States challenge existing historical 
narratives of both Latin American political activism as well as traditional understandings 
of Christianity’s role in the Reagan era. Liberation Theology is taken for granted as a 
movement exclusive to the Latin American context, without greater import abroad. 
Accounts of Latin American social movements often neglect to factor in the US as part of 
the broader continent that is America. Latin America nations are traditionally understood 
as political clients of the US, especially during the 20th century. It is taken for granted 
that the United States has strong material and cultural influence on it imperial subjects 
abroad, but the reverse is often overlooked, and the United States is assumed to be 
immune to cultural trends south of its border.  
To the contrary, interactions with religious activists abroad had a heavy influence 
on how many US Catholics, and even Protestants, understood the role of their faith in 
society. On seeing the effects of US interventionist policy in Central America, many US 
missionaries began to emulate their Latin American counterparts and took to the task of 
challenging US intervention. They further took their new worldview back home with 
them and used it as the basis for a new mission project to politically awaken their own 
fellow Americans, evangelizing at home just as much as abroad. The religious framing of 
the anti-intervention movement afforded Christian activists in the 1980s a level of 
heightened legitimacy that allowed them to upend Cold War politics, creating a unique 
challenge to US foreign policy scarcely seen prior. The response from right-wing 
Christians and politicians only served to underline the impact of Liberation Theology’s 
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effects on US Christians, as conservatives in the media and government coordinated 
vicious counterattacks to delegitimize the anti-intervention movement and realign 
religious discourse towards right-wing ends in a massive tug-of-war over the support of 
the religious rank-and-file within the US.  
Background: The Popular Church and the Nicaraguan Revolution 
 Six years prior to the Catholic Advance’s guest editorial, the Central American 
nation of Nicaragua became the center of international news when a revolutionary 
coalition led by the socialist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) ended the 40-
year long reign of the Somoza Dynasty.14 The Somoza family had been put into power 
largely due to the support of the United States, who trained the nation’s National Guard 
and handed control of it over to liberal army officer Anastasio Somoza García during the 
1930s after a period of constitutional crisis and civil war.15 The FSLN represented a sharp 
break in the nation’s political history, rejecting Nicaragua’s role as a client-state to the 
US as they courted support from the likes of Cuba and the Soviet Union during the height 
of the Cold War. The FSLN had been inspired by the success of the Cuban revolution 
decades earlier and found themselves with a similar challenge to Castro in the form of a 
hostile US government. The Reagan Administration had little desire to deal with the 
 
14 George Black, Triumph of the People (London: Zed Press, 1981), 4-5. The FSLN had been engaged in 
sporadic warfare to limited effect for most of the 1960s and early 1970s, and they gained massive traction 
and formed a broad coalition with support across Nicaragua after the 1972 earthquake and later the 
assassination Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of La Prensa, the only major opposition newspaper to 
Somoza. 
15 Ibid, 15-24. Somoza’s chief opposition was Augusto Cesar Sandino, a guerrilla leader who broke from 
the Liberal ranks and rejected calls for disarmament by the US ambassador and military. Only once US 
forces withdrew in 1933 did he begin to negotiate, demanding a permanent end to US intervention. After 
a year of contentious negotiations, Somoza’s Guardsmen assassinated Sandino in early 1934 to end his 
political pursuits. Sandino went on to serve as both a symbol and namesake for the later Sandinista 
movement that finally emerged victorious in 1979. 
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Sandinistas diplomatically and set to the task of arming and funding the Contras, a 
counter-revolutionary group that sought to return Nicaragua to pre-revolutionary 
conditions.16 The US had dominated Nicaragua’s politics through military intervention 
repeatedly during the early 20th century and approached the Sandinistas no differently. As 
the Reagan administration found, however, the Sandinistas had a key ally within the 
United States that their predecessors lacked: Christians. Through their own strategic 
alliance with Christian activists and clergy in Nicaragua, the revolutionary government 
had a host of allies and sympathizers past the Iron Curtain who could challenge US 
intervention. 
 The Somoza family previously enjoyed relatively uncritical support from 
Nicaragua’s bishops from the start of their rule in the 1930s up until the turn of the 1970s. 
Church-state relations were very close as the Catholic hierarchy lent the government 
support and legitimacy, and there were even instances of Nicaraguan priests serving with 
the National Guard.17 One resident of the Solentiname Islands, a remote archipelago on 
Lake Nicaragua, recalled that prior to the surge of Liberation Theology the only priest 
available to perform sacraments was one “Father Chacon” who was a “National Guard 
chaplain. He would scold the peasants. The whole sermon was just scolding. He was a 
Somocista.” Chacon further lambasted the enemies of the Somoza regime in his sermons, 
 
16 Lauren Frances Turek, “Ambassadors for the Kingdom of God or for America?”, Religions 7, no. 12 
(2016): 3. While US foreign policy historically leaned towards military intervention, the Carter 
administration did send aid to the Sandinista government early on and signaled a brief shift to anti-
intervention. 
1717 Andrew J Stein, “The Church,” in Nicaragua Without Illusions, ed. Thomas Walker (Wilmington, DE: 
Scholarly Resources, 1997), 235. 
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such as Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of La Prensa who was imprisoned for his 
opposition to the Somoza government.18 
 The Catholic Church as a legitimator of imperialist power well-preceded the 
Somoza dynasty. As was standard in Latin America, Catholic priests first arrived in 
Nicaragua with Spanish conquistadors and sanctified Spanish domination over the land 
and the indigenous peoples.19 Though some Nicaraguan priests did take part in attempted 
rebellions against the Spanish crown around the turn of the 19th century, the stance of the 
bishops and other members of the hierarchy was broadly monarchist. In 1812, the Vicar 
of Granada, José Antonio Chamorro went so far as to denounce all who opposed the 
Spanish crown as “traitors to God, to the religion, and to the King of the country.”20  
Once Nicaragua gained independence, the Catholic hierarchy maintained a close 
alliance with conservative forces. Though the General Assembly of the United Provinces 
of Central America abolished monasteries in 1830 and the first Constitution of Nicaragua 
guaranteed freedom of religion in 1838, president Fruto Chamorro restored the church’s 
protections and privileges in 1854. Though the church was in many ways ambivalent to 
the unstable politics of Nicaragua during the 19th century, Catholic officials often served 
as allies to foreign intervention. Granada Bishop José Hilario Herdocia extended his own 
support to US “adventurer” William Walker after he captured the city and installed his 
own puppet government. Walker was pleased with the endorsement and sent the Bishop 
his own letter writing that “Without the aid of religious sentiment… there can be no good 
 
18 Cited by Randall, Christians in the Nicaraguan Revolution, 52. 
19 Manzar Foroohar, The Catholic Church and Social Change in Nicaragua (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1989), 1. 
20 Ibid, 4-5. 
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government; for fear of God is the foundation of all social and political organizations.” 
Church authorities in Granada went so far as to furnish Walker’s government with loans 
in 1856 and further donated to his cause by taking silver from the Altar of the Merced 
Church and the stature of the Virgin of Mercedes.21  
Though a number of priests and bishops did oppose the likes of Walker, liberal 
anticlerical policies meant that the Church predominately supported Nicaragua’s 
conservative factions during times of instability and civil conflict. In 1893 liberal 
President José Santos de Zelaya reintroduced freedom of religion to the Nicaraguan 
constitution and in 1899 he further confiscated church property, which he followed-up by 
exiling numerous Catholic officials. This gave the Catholic Church common cause with a 
conservative leadership that was simultaneously backed by US foreign policy and US 
marine occupation after Zelaya was ousted in 1909. The new conservative government, 
initially headed by Adolfo Díaz, once more reversed anticlerical laws and restored both 
property and privilege to the Church and its officials. Knowing that a return to Liberal 
government meant a return to anticlerical policy, Nicaraguan clergy supported the new 
conservative regime and US occupation simultaneously. Though this support was mostly 
unspoken, Granada Bishop Canuto Reyes y Valladares of Granada was quite open about 
his support for the occupation and blessed the US marines in their fight to “finish off the 
Bandit Sandino” – the namesake of the same guerrillas who later defeated US 
intervention with Church support in the 1970s. While other bishops did oppose the 
 
21 Cited by Ibid, 6-8. Though Walker was hired by the Liberal factions during the civil war, he quickly had 
himself named president in 1856 and positioned himself against Liberal forces. He further sought to 
extend his influence over Central America with the goal of reintroducing slavery and expanding North 
American influence. He was eventually expelled from Central America and executed in Honduras after a 
failed attempt to regain control. 
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occupation, they did so often due to fears of US occupation bringing forth a “wave of 
Protestantism” rather than any specific political stance.22  
Though the Nicaraguan church was not always unified as a political body, its 
leadership broadly served the interests of a status quo that maintained traditional 
structures of power. Church leaders supported foreign intervention often enough 
throughout Nicaraguan history that until the 1970s it was often taken for granted that the 
Church was a conservative institution. FSLN co-founder Tomas Borge admitted in one 
letter to Trappist monk and future Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal in a 1969 letter 
that he was skeptical of the Catholic Church serving as an ally to the revolution’s cause, 
as he “was educated in the Catholic Faith, from whose beliefs I distanced myself with 
disgust. I knew a God who joyfully rang the church bells and dressed up when General 
Somoza visited León… A God who forgave the sins of the rich, but forbade poor young 
women pregnant with ‘natural’ child from entering the church.” Though new theological 
trends from the Vatican and Medellín gave him hope for a new type of faith, he felt the 
alliance between religious activists and the revolution was “precarious” at the time.23 
These activists and organizers in Nicaragua were colloquially known as members 
of the popular church and were closely associated with the Sandinista government of the 
1980s but traced their lineage to the Second Vatican Council of 1962 and the ensuing 
movement known as Liberation Theology. Vatican II sought to reassess the role of the 
Catholic Church in the daily lives of its followers and among the council’s conclusions 
was a need to reinsert itself into the material lives of members as well as the spiritual by 
 
22 Cited by Ibid, 12 - 16.  
23 Tomás Borge, Christianity and Revolution: Tomás Borge’s Theology of Life, ed. and trans. Andrew Reding 
(Ossining, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), 13. 
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focusing on a “preferential option for the poor.”24 The church then began to double down 
on efforts to improve the lives of its adherents, especially those most as risk 
economically. This message took special purchase among theologians and religious 
officials in Latin America, who built upon the idea and extrapolated it further. They 
argued that the Catholic Church should not just provide relief for poverty but should fight 
to end its root causes. The bishops of the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM) 
convened in 1968 for their own conference in Medellín, Colombia, where they 
determined that being a “church for the poor” meant not only a liberation from individual 
sins but also a liberation from “social sins.” This encouraged priests, nuns, and 
missionaries to act as social activists challenging institutional problems of inequity, 
repression, and poverty instead of acting solely as confessors or distributors of charity.25 
Left and liberal clergymen in Latin America used Vatican II as an opening to expand 
their mission into the political realm. 
The Medellín Conference transformed the way that clergy and laity alike viewed 
their relationship to the Catholic faith, as advocacy for social justice became a key 
component of expressing devotion. This new wave of socially-conscious Catholicism was 
dubbed “Liberation Theology” – a name derived from Peruvian priest Gustavo 
Gutiérrez’s 1973 book A Theology of Liberation. According to Gutiérrez, the goal of 
Liberation Theology was to reject systems of exploitation and oppression “to abolish the 
current unjust situation and to build a different society, freer and more human.”26 
 
24 Daniel Jacobson, “The Roman Catholic Church: committed to the poor in Guatemala,” The Canadian 
Geographer 54, no. 3 (2010), 378. 
25 Peter Hebblethewaite “Liberation and John Paul II: The Vatican’s Perception of Latin America,” Index on 
Censorship 12, no. 5 (1983): 10. 




Uniquely, Gutiérrez cited even secular revolutions such as the French and Russian 
revolutions as important precedents for the common man challenging the elite and called 
for the Catholic Church to serve as a source of political mobilization in a similar vein. 
According to Liberation Theology, faith should serve as a means of politicizing the 
populace to liberate themselves from inequity and build God’s Kingdom on Earth.27 This 
meant directly challenging dictatorial institutions and the exploitative nature of global 
capitalism, turning the historically conservative institution of the church against unequal 
hierarchies. CIA analysts identified Liberation Theology as especially dangerous to US 
influence over the region as it could legitimize popular protests and guerrilla movements 
that challenged authoritarian governments in the region that had US support.28 The 
Catholic Church had previously served as an ally to right wing and autocratic 
governments as well as US interests, but Medellín represented a turn in the church’s 
relationship to the political establishment both in Latin American and the United States. 
Liberation Theology reached a zenith with the Nicaraguan Revolution, playing a 
key role in overthrowing the nation’s long-lasting dictatorship. Anastasio Somoza García 
was assassinated in 1956, but his sons Luis and Anastasio Somoza Debayle (AKA 
“Tachito”) soon picked up his mantle after his death as “Tachito” ascended to the head of 
the National Guard.29 Through use of violence and terror to shut down all popular 
opposition from left-wing and conservative opponents alike, the Somoza family 
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thoroughly dominated all aspects of the nation’s politics.30 These decades of brutal 
suppression were punctuated by moments of flagrant corruption, with the Somozas 
personally enriching themselves through domination of the private sector and even stolen 
relief funds in the aftermath of the 1972 earthquake that shattered the capital of 
Managua.31 Decades of abuse not only left almost all sectors of society dissatisfied with 
the current state of affairs but eroded confidence in institutional opposition to such a 
degree that even high-ranking church officials spoke out in support of the guerrilla 
revolution spearheaded by the Sandinistas. The influence of Liberation Theology and the 
dissatisfaction with the status-quo came together and pushed Catholic activists to put 
their support behind leftist revolutionaries – a traditional enemy – as the alternative the 
nation needed. 
Nuns, missionaries, and priests then played key roles as recruiters and 
propagandists for the Sandinistas, whose clandestine nature meant they had a limited 
reach to the public on their own. The support and confidence of religious activists were 
key to their gradual build-up and ascendance during the 1970s after floundering the 
decade prior. The political situation under the Somoza regime became so unbearable that 
at the peak of the guerrilla war in 1979 Managua Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo 
reached out to the Nicaraguan public and advocated the need for revolution, even by 
force, and assured the public that socialism was not to be feared.32 Though Nicaraguan 
Catholics were not entirely united on what “liberation” meant, they almost unilaterally 
agreed that the Somozas had to be removed. The legitimacy that the Catholic hierarchy 
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provided went a long way in allowing the Sandinistas to solidify their leadership position 
in the aftermath of the Somoza regime, preventing what FSLN co-founder Tomas Borge 
feared would be a “great bloodbath.”33 While the FSLN was a secular ruling body, they 
invited several activists priests of Nicaragua’s popular church to fill key roles in their 
new government, and they invited Catholic clergy and Christian NGOs to serve as 
watchdogs on their human rights record.34 Soon they reached abroad as well and invited 
similar officials from the United States to do the same. 
Left and liberal elements from US Christendom responded to this call and 
coalesced to form perhaps the largest domestic opposition block to US foreign policy 
during the 1980s. Kerry Ptacek, research director of the conservative think-tank Institute 
for Religion and Democracy (IRD), identified religious organizations in the United States 
as “the most active group and most influential group lobbying against U.S. policy [in 
Latin America].”35 The religious campaigns against Reagan’s foreign policy were based 
on a general anti-imperialist sentiment, and the common ground of Christian organization 
provided a strong foundation for transnational dialogue and solidarity. Through 
communication with counterparts in Central America, both religious officials and laity, 
US missionaries absorbed many teachings of Liberation Theology regarding concepts of 
“societal sins” and the need to protest violence and repression from the government as a 
spiritual imperative. The 1980s saw Catholic and Protestant groups alike begin to fund 
information and research networks such as the North American Congress on Latin 
 
33 Cited by Giulio Girardi, Faith and Revolution in Nicaragua: Convergence and Contradictions (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis Books, 1987), 28. 
34 Paul Jeffrey, “Ernesto Cardenal believed in revolution, and in the church doing its part,” National 
Catholic Reporter (Kansas City, MI), March 3, 2020. 
35 Cited by John Holmes and Ed Rogers, “’Coercive Utopians’: Church Groups Bless Sandinista Cause,” The 
Washington Times (Washington D.C.), April 12, 1985. 
17 
 
America (NACLA) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) which 
performed counter-research on the Reagan administration’s foreign policy. NACLA’s 
initial headquarters began in the Manhattan offices of the National Council of Churches 
(NCC) and WOLA similarly operated out of a United Methodist Church office for most 
of the 1980s as religious activists saw Central America as a moral battleground for civil 
rights and social justice.36 Protests and critiques from such organizations pushed Reagan 
to make grand appeals to Catholic voters in his 1984 re-election campaign to fight the 
surge of religious protests as well. He emphasized his opposition to abortion, his support 
of prayer in school, and his respect for the Papacy as reasons for his credentials over his 
opponent Walter Mondale in his speeches to Catholic audiences.37 A popular spirit of 
resistance and solidarity had traveled from Latin America to the United States and 
conservatives felt the need to push back. While many assume Liberation Theology was a 
quirk of Latin America, it is evident that northern counterparts were watching its growth 
intently. 
The Christian antiwar movement of the 1980s tells a story of an inverted 
evangelism. US missionaries in Latin America found themselves inspired by interactions 
with Liberation Theology to take up a solidarity movement with Latin Americans against 
the militaristic excesses of their own government. If one takes as their framework that the 
ties between US and Nicaraguan activists primarily emerged after the 1979 revolution, 
then it can be extrapolated that the ensuing protests were an extension of pre-existing 
partisan conflict. The issue of Nicaragua and the Contras were then an important political 
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wedge that simply revealed pre-existing tensions within US Christendom. By looking at 
the pre-war period and viewing the connections that were building prior to the success of 
the Sandinistas, one can extrapolate that Central American religious activists had a deep 
impact on US Christians. The experience of missionaries and visiting officials from the 
US to Central America profoundly altered their perceptions of US intervention in a way 
that led them to direct action, and they turned their efforts to evangelizing to those at 
home based on their encounters with the popular church and Liberation Theology. 
The umbrella of the Catholic Church provided a common ground between the two 
nations and Nicaraguan revolutionaries were able to cross ideological borders that had 
plagued other revolutionaries in the region. The prescriptions of Medellín and the 
language of Liberation Theology allowed for American missionaries to identify societal 
issues they previously ignored and articulate a dissident political response. This flow of 
ideas from “client” to empire caused many US faithful to question their government in a 
previously unseen way and sparked a massive tug-of-war between left and right factions 
among US Christians. While the Reagan administration sought to define Catholic identity 
as a matter of patriotic identity, grassroots organizers encouraged the faithful to see 
themselves as moral watchdogs combatting the excesses of their government. To 
participate even passively in the violence the state funded was to take part in a societal 
sin, one that could have drastic effects on foreign faithful and even their own families in 
the US. The “homicidal fantasies” of GI Joe played right into the propaganda efforts of 
Reagan’s foreign policy and if nothing was done then young men could be sent to Central 
America to die in brutal warfare a la Vietnam.38 While the “end” of Liberation Theology 
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in the 1990s may have revealed the limits of this transnational dialogue, the Christian 
anti-intervention movement represented a unique moment in time, and Liberation 























Chapter 1: Maryknollers: Transformations in the Cold War, 1950 - 1980 
“Catholic Marines” to “Communist Sympathizers” 
Nuns and priests from the Maryknoll Society of New York lobbied heavily 
against the Reagan Administration’s foreign policy during the 1980s, primarily in 
opposition to funding of the Contras, and they had the ear of influential politicians 
including the Catholic Democratic Speaker of the House Thomas P “Tip” O’Neill. While 
Reagan claimed his policy had the backing of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
O’Neill supposedly countered by touting the support of clergymen and nuns. Reagan and 
his conservative Catholic allies insisted that the proper position of US Catholics was one 
of patriotism – that the pope supported US foreign policy and Catholics ought to as well. 
According to Reagan, the Maryknoll nuns opposing the Contras were at best naïve 
women and at worst communist dupes – neither fit to be Catholic nor American.39 When 
a group of missionaries including two Maryknoll nuns were killed in El Salvador in late 
1980, US ambassador to the UN Jean Kirkpatrick dismissed the incident and claimed the 
victims “were not just nuns but political activists,” implying that they were combatants 
involved in a shootout rather than civilian targets of assassination.40 The hostility and ire 
directed at the Maryknollers represented a stark turn from interventionist attitudes mere 
decades prior. The journey of Maryknoll missionaries from tools of US foreign policy to 
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outspoken critics of US intervention is informative of the broader journey American 
Christendom underwent during the 1970s and 1980s. 
The Maryknoll sisters were among the US’s oldest order of missionary nuns, 
beginning with their first mission to China in the early 20th century. For the Vatican and 
American Catholics organizations like the Maryknoll society represented a turn for US 
Catholicism – the states were no longer “mission territory” but now a hub that could send 
out its own missionaries.41 Not only did they represent US Catholicism abroad, they also 
played a part in the US’s anticommunist crusade after their expulsion from China by 
Chairman Mao Zedong following his 1949 communist victory.42 Mother Columba – the 
second Mother General of the Maryknoll sisters – was a noted supporter of Republican 
Senator Joseph McCarthy and consistently “fed McCarthy’s ideas” of anticommunist 
paranoia to those beneath her in command.43 Something changed after their experiences 
in Latin America, causing a shift in how these models of US Catholicism perceived their 
relationship to politics and the state, putting them at odds with the Reagan 
administration’s stance of fundamentalist anticommunism. 
 The Maryknoll society was founded in 1911 and began its mission to China in 
1917. They worked for the next 25 years primarily in Asia and the Pacific, including 
locales such as the Philippines and Hawaii. The perils of World War II forced many 
Maryknoll missionaries to repatriate and reconsider their mission territories, and so they 
changed their focus to Latin America, beginning missions to Mexico, Chile, Peru, and 
Guatemala which were relatively shielded from the dangers and persecutions of the 
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war.44 According to Maryknoll priest and missionary Lawrence A. Egan, Maryknoll 
missionaries generally remained apolitical during their missions. While many described 
themselves as anticommunist due to negative reception in China, they were often 
assigned to relative “backwaters” in places such as Huehuetenango, Guatemala and thus 
severed from news and mass media. Accordingly, even as Guatemala experienced a 
series of coups that resulted in the 1945 election of Juan José Arevalo, the writings, and 
correspondences of Maryknollers seldom reference politics.45 Egan does concede 
however that from the 40s and into the 1960s, Maryknollers leaned conservative. In 1954, 
the missionaries followed the general line from the Church Hierarchy as president Jacobo 
Arbenz (successor to Arevalo) was deposed in a US-backed coup led by Col. Castillo 
Armas. Castillo Armas courted the church as an ally – reversing decades old anticlerical 
laws – and Maryknollers broadly supported his “liberation” campaign against Arbenz, 
who was supposedly a communist sympathizer.46 According to Egan, Maryknollers 
generally did not question US foreign policy but were relatively passive overall. 
Diplomatic historian Theresa Keeley argues a different relationship between 
Maryknollers and US interests abroad, wherein the Maryknollers and other missionaries 
were active allies to the State Department and directly participated in US intervention. 
Maryknoll sister Maria del Rey penned Nun in Red China in 1953 – a fictionalized 
account of one nun imprisoned by communist officials as a sort of modern martyr. The 
novel was later adapted into the film The Bamboo Cross and Time magazine portrayed 
the Maryknoll sisters as a “worldwide spiritual army” who were to help preserve 
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civilization itself against the growing tide of communism and immorality in the Cold 
War. Maryknollers during the 1940s and 1950s traveled with the military frequently, and 
Maryknoll Bishop Francis Xavier Ford was an open supporter of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalists as they battled with Mao Zedong’s communist forces in the civil war. Mao’s 
suspicions that Maryknollers worked as spies were not unfounded, as many missionaries 
received briefings from the state department and shared intelligence with the CIA. Bishop 
Ford was eventually sent a prison camp in 1952 where he died after he was caught 
reporting to the US consulate on “Communist troop movements, economic conditions, 
communications, and transport facilities in his area.”47 From the beginning of the Cold 
War, the US State Department saw missionaries – Protestant and Catholic – as an asset to 
promote US interests abroad. Foreign governments, be they friendly or hostile, took this 
to heart and treated missionaries accordingly by either giving them special consideration 
or deeming them seditious.  
Similar to how his predecessors supported Chinese Nationalists even after their 
defeat and exile by Mao, Reagan pursued a policy of arming and supporting an exiled and 
disaffected force of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries known as the Contras. The 
Contras were a guerrilla militant force opposed to the Sandinista regime led primarily by 
Somoza’s exiled supporters and surviving National Guard force. According to the 
newsletter ALERT, 46 out of 48 commanders of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force’s 
leaders (FDN) had previously been members of the National Guard under Somoza. The 
organization’s main goal was to reverse Nicaragua to pre-revolutionary conditions.48 
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Reagan’s foreign policy was uniquely aggressive in this regard, pushing a $100 million 
support package for the Contras in 1986 even as the US maintained diplomatic relations 
with Nicaragua and was technically at peace, but it broadly represented an escalation 
rather than a change. The US government had traditionally seen Latin American nations 
as client-states and often exerted its influence to stymy reform and halt revolution, as 
seen with the state department’s virulent opposition to the Cuban revolution of 1959 to 
their support of Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 coup of Salvador Allende’s government in 
Chile. Whether or not the movements or governments in question were truly communist 
or merely reformist, the US State Department and Central Intelligence Agency reacted 
swiftly and decisively to see them smothered. Historian E. Bradford Burns of the 
University of California identified Latin American nationalism in broad terms as the 
common cause for the US’s violent reprisals in the region. Nationalism presented a 
“robust force seeking to terminate dependency and initiate development.”49 The use of 
anticommunism as justification was often quite spurious but served as a convenient 
excuse to smother any movement towards national sovereignty. Economic independence 
and local control over natural resources consistently earned the ire of the US government. 
Lawrence Egan concurred, noting that in hindsight Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz 
had merely been a “liberal reformer” whose policies of land redistribution had conflicted 
with the economic and political interests of US corporations and the Guatemalan elite – 
not a “communist dupe” as propaganda had claimed.50  
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Similarly in 1893, the US had denounced the liberal President José Santos Zelaya 
of Nicaragua as a “tyrant” as he sought support from competing imperial powers to 
initiate construction of a canal in Nicaragua to connect the Atlantic and Pacific in direct 
competition to the canal that the US had begun to plan in Panama. After Zelaya ordered 
the execution of two US saboteurs who sought to undermine his troops movements in 
1909, the US responded swiftly with invasion and had him overthrown to install their 
own head of state. US Marines occupied Nicaragua in near perpetuity from 1912-1933 as 
its preferred conservative candidates for leadership floundered to gain support until they 
eventually found their champions in the Somoza dynasty.51 For the remainder of its 
history, Nicaragua was one way or another tethered to the whims of US foreign policy.  
The 1979 triumph of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) then 
presented a challenge to US dominance in the supposed client state that sparked an 
“obsession” with returning Nicaragua to pre-revolutionary conditions. While US foreign 
policy in Nicaragua had always been domineering, the Reagan administration justified its 
actions with the new language of the Cold War. If they could not stop communism from 
taking hold in Nicaragua, there would be a “domino effect” and soon its neighbors would 
crumble to Soviet influence as well. This provided justification for the US to intervene by 
any means necessary, regardless of its deleterious effects on the lives of Latin American 
civilians.52 And unlike Arbenz in Guatemala who had been declared a communist 
fallaciously, the Sandinistas of Nicaragua wore the label of socialist proudly and openly 
sought the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba.53 Surprisingly though, while Catholics 
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proved an ally for the coup in Guatemala, Nicaraguan Catholics and the Maryknollers 
broadly opposed the counterrevolution in Nicaragua and they would see to making the 
task as difficult as possible for Reagan’s White House.  
The Maryknoll society began their mission in Latin America apolitically, but their 
interactions with theologians in Central and South America gradually altered their 
positions. Prior to the conference of Medellín, they approached their mission work as a 
spiritual matter, with missionaries of the 1950s being given no teachings regarding issues 
of poverty or social justice. The Maryknollers were more “modern” than other religious 
orders due to the flexibility required of missionaries, but even then, their perspective was 
limited. Early on they regarded the subjects of their missions largely as “pagans” whose 
souls needed to be saved through preaching the word of Christ alone.54 Material 
intervention was not a priority and even with the relative latitude afforded to them the 
Maryknollers had conflicts early on in their encounters with the “folk Catholicism” of 
Central Americans.  
Maryknollers eventually came to associate themselves very closely with the poor 
and often marginalized indigenous peoples such as local Mayan ethnic groups in 
Guatemala, but missionary William Mullan recalled that “Up until the 60s most 
Maryknollers… questioned Mayan syncretism with Catholicism. In Huehuetenango, the 
Church authorities made the distinction between ‘costumbre’ and ‘catholic practices and 
beliefs.’” As Lawrence Egan himself recalled, the early Maryknollers in Guatemala saw 
it as their role to combat the presence of “costumbre” and local religious customs in favor 
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of instituting a more orthodox Catholicism. They frequently came into conflict with 
Mayan costumbre leaders in their communities over issues such as their use of Catholic 
statues in “pagan” religious rites, which ended with the Guatemalan military breaking up 
a local protest after costumbre practitioners threatened to storm the local church.55 
Generally, missionaries in the mid 20th century did not hold much respect for traditions 
and interpretations held by those they preached towards. The Maryknollers did not enter 
with an open-mind towards locals right away – their shift to activism was gradual and 
came from protracted dialogue with local religious leaders and laity.  
Christian Base Communities and Civil Disobedience  
Although Catholic critiques of capitalism went all the way back to the 1890s with 
Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, wherein he identified socialism and capitalism alike as 
dangerous to the church’s values, Walter LaFeber notes that the Catholic Church spent 
most of its energy in the 20th century solely combatting socialists. In Latin America, the 
Church Hierarchy had existed primarily to “comfort the rich, bless the military, and 
Christianize (but not disturb) the peasantry.” As discussed in the introduction, the 
church’s attitudes towards social ills of poverty and inequity began to change in the 
1960s with the Second Vatican Council, wherein Pope John XXIII warned that revolution 
would be inevitable if something were not done to create better standards of living the 
world over. Advocacy of reform was not enough, as the church continued to lose 
adherents and respect across more impoverished regions of Latin America where 
revolution continued regardless, as seen in Chile where the Christian Democratic Party 
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achieved only temporary victory with the aid of the Catholic hierarchy – with Salvador 
Allende’s communist party defeating them in 1968and Allende being overthrown the far 
right-wing Pinochet with the support of the Nixon administration as a result. Many 
Catholic leaders, both laity and ordained, felt that they needed to go farther, and thus the 
religious revolution of Medellín found itself entwined in the secular revolutions of Latin 
America as part of its mission to create a preferential option for the poor.56 
One of the main innovations of Liberation Theology in Latin America was the 
“comunidad eclesial de base” or the Christian Base Community (CEB). Composed of 
about 20-25 people, CEBs were usually led by a priest or “pastoral agent” who guided 
lay-people in bible study and sought to link Catholic theology to their everyday 
concerns.57 As Brazilian priest Alvaro Barreiro described, this type of communal bible-
study served a purpose of dual proselytization, wherein the members of the CEBs were 
indoctrinated into a more orthodox and Romanized Catholicism (as opposed to regional 
“folk Catholicism”) all the while their newfound organizational capacity would allow 
them to radicalize the broader apparatus of the church towards social ends.58 According 
Nicaraguan activist Vidaluz Meneses, it was taboo for a lay-person to even read the Bible 
before Vatican II due to the notion that scriptural interpretation was simply beyond their 
capacity for comprehension.59 The Christian Base Community then loosened the 
monopoly that the Church Hierarchy held over interpretation of scripture and allowed for 
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a truly revolutionary form of Catholic theology to take root as common people and 
radical clergymen could now share their own theological conclusions. The traditionally 
top-down structure of the Catholic church was democratized and the organizational 
apparatus of the CEB created a strong base for grassroots organizers. 
In Nicaragua, CEBs and similar Bible study-groups often shared quite radical 
interpretations of the Gospels. Trappist monk Ernesto Cardenal, who had studied at the 
Abbey of Gethsemane with Thomas Merton in Kentucky, formed his own artistic-
religious community on the archipelago of Solentiname in Lake Nicaragua. There he 
created his own Bible-study group with the island’s residents, and in their studies and 
discussions he put forth that the prophets of the Old and New Testaments were sent to 
denounce “bad governments” – not just individual sins – to set the stage for God’s 
kingdom on Earth.60 Ergo, modern revolutionaries such as Che Guevara who fought 
against evil regimes were a fulfillment of Christ’s teachings. A guerrilla revolutionary 
movement could then be justified in line with the Bible if it fought to defend the poor and 
downtrodden as opposed to seeking vengeance or enriching itself.61 Cardenal was 
eventually named Minister of Culture under the Sandinista government – a testament to 
the growing compatibility between radical priests and revolution. The popular church of 
Liberation Theology and the revolutionary government saw in one another a mutual 
opportunity to spread their views and ideas. 
 The politicized nature of the CEBs in Nicaragua made them an excellent staging 
ground for popular protests as the abuses of the Somoza government became ever more 
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egregious during the 1970s. Pope Paul VI claimed that violence was antithetical to 
Christian values, but clergy inspired by the rhetoric of Liberation Theology posited that 
inaction against repressive regimes and poverty was a tacit acceptance “institutional 
violence.”62 As stated in Medellín, sin could exist at a societal level. Mass organization 
and protest was then extrapolated as an extension of one’s faith – a sort of religious 
praxis that became necessary with the Managua earthquake of the 1972.  
 Anastasio Somoza Debayle already grappled with crises of legitimacy prior to the 
earthquake. Although the Somoza dynasty boasted an expansion of industry, Nicaragua 
under his leadership could hardly be described as economically independent. As rural 
campesinos were forced off their land – with land being consolidated into fewer hands – 
cities such as Managua swelled with an increasingly marginalized population of migrants. 
Somoza’s co-optation of the growing state industry also smothered effective conservative 
opposition as the once potent political faction lost its economic autonomy. Using his 
position as the nation’s leader and head of the National Guard, Somoza was able to 
accrue massive personal assets that he could use as both a stick and carrot even over the 
nation’s elites. This gave him a relatively comfortable control over all classes of 
Nicaraguan society, unbroken for most of the 1960s. The growing gap between the 
wealthy and poor as well as the gradual dissolution of institutional opposition left those 
dissatisfied with few places to turn; supporting a guerrilla group like the FSLN seemed to 
many as the only effective means to create change.63 The 1972 earthquake gave the FSLN 
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a crisis that made the contradictions and abuses of the Somoza regime even more 
impossible to ignore, and allowed them to secure support from even broader swaths of 
Nicaraguan society, including the church. 
 The 1972 earthquake flattened vast portions of Managua, killed around 10,000 
people, and dislocated more than 100,000 residents. While this disaster in some ways 
stimulated the economy by generating new demands for construction and associated 
industries while the prices of Nicaraguan exports such as sugar, coffee, and beef were 
high, it revealed new levels of corruption within the Somoza regime. Somoza used the 
disaster to personally line his pockets through the creation of his own bank, insurance 
company, and construction group, and he dramatically failed to administer resources to 
the struggling population in the wake of the disaster as he instead enriched himself 
through relief funds and goods.64 The material situation for the already struggling lower 
classes grew worse as the nation’s leader grew richer, spurring mass radicalization. As 
traditional political parties such as the conservatives or socialists had largely failed to 
form an effective opposition, this meant that Managua’s disaffected had to seek new 
avenues to express their grievances, and the city’s Christian Base Communities formed 
an excellent basis for organizing against the regime. 
 The CEBs, informed by the teachings of Medellín and Vatican II, became some of 
the only venues for popular protest during this period. As the capital lay in ruins, Somoza 
shut down constitutional guarantees, declared martial law, and began to heavily censor 
the press. Elements within the church had been growing more critical of the government 
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since the late 1960s, but mismanagement of earthquake-relief created a near-consensus 
against the Somoza regime. With the regime funneling relief funds for Somoza’s own 
enrichment, it fell largely upon missionaries, priests, and lay activists to take up the effort 
of aiding those displaced. This extended past Catholic activists as even the relative 
minority of Protestant Nicaraguans began organizing recovery efforts, such as Dr. 
Gustavo Parajon who founded the Evangelical Committee for Aid and Development 
(CEPAD) in direct response to the earthquake to coordinate emergency relief.65 Seeing 
the already poor living conditions of many Managua residents exacerbated by the disaster 
had a radicalizing effect on many religious officials, especially as the government stifled 
their ability to even run Bible studies in the aftermath of the disaster as such activities 
risked being “subversive.”66 If they were not already subversive, Somoza’s appalling 
response rendered them few other options than to become subversive. Church officials 
who were perhaps skeptical of Liberation Theology suddenly began to change their 
opinion upon seeing the conditions of their congregations dramatically worsen. 
To create the “preferential option for the poor” established by Vatican II and 
Medellín, religious officials had to battle sources of poverty, and this required political 
action. Christian Base Communities, which were especially in tune with the precepts of 
Liberation Theology, quickly became one of the most powerful allies to the FSLN as a 
result. As church officials could operate much more openly than traditional political 
groups, the CEBs became excellent sites for propaganda and recruitment to the 
Sandinista cause across both urban and rural areas. While the church had been an ally of 
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the elite for most of Nicaragua’s history, Vatican II and Medellín created a space for a 
more critical ideology to emerge and made the rationale for alliance with the leftist FSLN 
more and more justifiable.67 And while the church had once legitimated dictatorships 
such as the Somoza dynasty, the support of the popular church and even elements within 
the Catholic hierarchy would legitimate the new Sandinista government after their 1979 
victory.68 Even more uniquely, Liberation Theology legitimated the revolution in the eyes 
of many foreign Catholics as well, including missionaries such as the Maryknollers who 
were there to witness the events 
Inverted Evangelism  
A group of six Maryknoll Sisters arrived on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua in the 
town of Siuna at the request of the Capuchin Fathers in 1944, tasked with staffing a 
school and clinic in the small mining town. From the beginning, the Maryknoll sisters 
were well-received in Nicaragua, building relationships with the Assumption Sisters of 
Managua headed by Madre Francisca as they studied Spanish in their boarding school 
before beginning their mission proper. When they finally arrived in Siuna, they were 
greeted positively by the local townsfolk, who left flowers at their patio.69 Over time, the 
Maryknoll Sisters expanded operations across the country and were even joined by lay 
missioners and Maryknoll Fathers in towns such as Ocotal or Pueblo Nuevo.70 
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At the outset of their mission, the Maryknoll Sisters were quite aware of the 
contradictions at play within Nicaraguan society. When they arrived in 1944, Siuna was a 
highly stratified area – the locals and miners lived in “poor shacks of dull, unpainted 
wood with tin-roofing.” The roads were unpaved, except for the gravel pathway leading 
to the convent and the school – dubbed “Maryknoll Boulevard.” The town itself was so 
cut-off from the rest of the country that the sisters had to take a propeller plane to reach 
the “isolated jungle” that was otherwise only accessible by horseback. Though the 
Nicaraguans lived in poverty, the mines were rich in gold and copper, and the Canadian 
staff that administered the mines (owned by a US company) had modern amenities of 
electricity, running water, and even enjoyed a golf course, tennis court, private pool, and 
their own school and hospital separate from the local population.71 The class divide was 
stark, but it would take some time for the Maryknollers to develop a sense of class 
consciousness. They saw themselves not as activists, but as teachers of scripture and 
occasionally administers of charity. Over time, changes within the church hierarchy and 
interpretations of scripture allowed a shift in perspective and in discourse as the sisters 
observed regional theological trends. 
Though missionaries were considered the forward guard of American civilization 
and acted as the tip of the spear for US intervention and military activities just decades 
before, missionaries coming to Central America found their own perspectives 
dramatically changed. In a 1983 joint-response to a speech by President Reagan, 47 US 
missionaries in Nicaragua from Catholic orders such as the Maryknollers in addition to 
several protestant denominations identified themselves with Liberation Theology in their 
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opposition to US foreign policy. The letter singled out Reagan’s policy of intervention as 
the cause of crises gripping El Salvador and warned that the president’s words gave the 
public a “very distorted view” of the situation in Central America. They lauded the 
situation in Nicaragua by contrast, where the Sandinista government allowed religious 
workers the freedom to “exercise the preferential option for the poor stressed by the Latin 
American bishops at Medellín and Puebla… Nicaragua is one of the few Latin American 
countries in which those efforts for the poor are echoed rather repressed by the 
government.” The missionaries further emphasized that poor civilians suffered the most 
from US foreign policy, which amounted to an illegal “undeclared war.”72 US 
Missionaries in the 1980s began to proselytize less to “foreign pagans” and more to the 
uneducated or unaware in their own country.  
This shift can be seen on the individual level with the life and death of Sister 
Maura Clarke, a Maryknoll nun who was assassinated by a rightwing Salvadoran death-
squad in 1980 alongside three other missionaries (including fellow Maryknoller Ita Ford) 
after two decades of mission work in Nicaragua. Entering religious life as a Maryknoll 
nun in 1950, Maura’s missionary work started more locally – in the Bronx. While she had 
hoped for a more distant mission in Africa, she was instead assigned to work at the 
Bronx’s Saint Anthony of Padua school as the area was still deemed “mission territory.” 
During her time as a schoolteacher in New York, Maura’s students and colleagues 
praised her for her patience and generosity, but she had little in the way of a radical 
ideology. Surrounded by violence and poverty, she saw it as her duty to aid her students 
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however possible, but she seldom attempted to analyze the root cause of their needs or 
the societal implications therein.73 According to friends, Maura prioritized charity as a 
virtue often to her own detriment, but she did not have an articulated ideology that 
questioned the existence of poverty itself. 
 This would not begin to change until 1959 when she was relocated to a new 
assignment in Siuna. Even then, Maura and her fellow sisters remained apolitical-to-
conservative in their political leanings. When Maura left for Nicaragua in 1959, she flew 
from Miami to Managua on board the same plane as dictator Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle’s mother-in-law. While this was a coincidence, it well symbolized the good 
relationship between the Maryknoll sisters and the Nicaraguan dictator.74 In 1963 she and 
her sisters not only sang a hymn to honor Somoza at a mass in Siuna, but Maura even 
poured his tea when he visited the convent afterwards.75 Maura’s ideological change 
came in time not solely through her own study of the bible or witnessing of poverty, but 
through dialogue with local laity and clergy in the aftermath of Vatican II and Medellín 
which served as early encounters between US clergy and Liberation Theology. 
 What was once one-way proselytizing became a dialogue as the Maryknoll nuns 
and Capuchin priests in Siuna found their “students” had begun to read the bible for 
themselves to form their own conclusions. The growing presence of the Christian Base 
Communities during the 1960s – after Vatican II and Medellín – changed the relationship 
between the laity and scriptural study. Conversion became a conversation, not merely a 
lecture, as common people were encouraged to read the bible for themselves and share 
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their own interpretations as Maryknoll missionaries adopted the CEB as a model for 
study. At the same time, the missionaries in Siuna began to interact more with the adults 
of the community, with Maura making a point of interacting with the families of her 
students. The class differences in Nicaragua were already stark but engaging in broader 
discussions with Nicaraguans – not merely proselytizing – opened the doors for the 
Maryknollers and other foreign missionaries to question the political situation in the 
country.76 Concern for the spiritual became entwined with a concern for the material as 
they became ever more-involved in the lives and concerns with lay activists and clergy 
local to the area. 
 Cooperation with Nicaraguan nationals can be seen elsewhere in their mission 
during this period as well; one 1975 report on the Maryknoll Society’s “Non-Parochial” 
Health Program in Ocotal made special mention that all volunteer personnel involved in 
the program were Nicaraguans. This included two lay-women volunteers, two doctors, 
one dentist, and a lab technician.77 While focus on childhood education still dominated 
the Maryknollers’ curriculum in most areas, other reports indicate an increased 
interaction with Nicaraguan adults from the late 1960s through the 1970s as well. In 1973 
they began running “Leadership Training Courses” in Ocotal, which records indicate had 
equal attendance to their Youth Groups in the area. They also operated six broad “prayer 
groups” as well in 1975, which had a total membership of 78 participants.78 By 1984 they 
had listed the creation of Christian Base Communities in rural areas as a major objective 
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of their pastoral plans in the Diocese of Matagalpa, showing how thoroughly the 
conclusions reached at Medellín had affected their approach to missionary work.79 
 While opportunities for protest and activism were scarce in Siuna, which was 
isolated by both mountains and jungle, Maura found herself becoming increasingly 
politicized in the late 1960s along with many other missionaries who had spent time 
abroad. When she had briefly returned stateside in 1969, those close to her already noted 
a shift in her perspective as she was now more skeptical of the military and of the general 
patriotism that she found interwoven into church services in New York. Exposure to the 
violence perpetuated by the US’s allies and surrogates in Central America left her and 
other Maryknollers much more dissident and dissatisfied with their nation’s conduct than 
Maryknollers of the past.80 As one example of this rising activist spirit, a group of 
Catholic activists led by a former Maryknoll priest and nun broke into a Maryland draft 
board to destroy draft records in the midst of the Vietnam War just the year before Maura 
returned home to the US.81 The changing structure of their order during this time 
furthermore eliminated the role of “Mother Superior” and replaced it with an elected 
governing board.82 The priests and nuns of the order suddenly had a command structure 
that could better reflect their own views, and novitiates could be exposed to a broader 
 
79 Fr. Ted Custer, Pastoral Plan for the Parish of Terrabona, Diocese of Matagalpa Nic., May 6, 1984, MFB 
Central America Records, Box 40, Folder 2, Maryknoll Mission Archives, Ossining, New York. 
80 Some Catholic antiwar activities began in the 1960s with protests of the Vietnam War independent of 
this activism, as seen with the Berrigan brothers discussed  briefly here and in Chapter 4. This was still 
often on the fringes however, and the Berrigans were largely “heirs to the mostly nonreligious American 
radical movements of the past” who focused principally on non-violence whereas the Maryknollers of the 
1970s took on a thoroughly anti-imperialist mindset from Latin American scriptural readings. Murray 
Polner and Jim O’Grady, Disarmed and Dangerous: The Radical Lives and Times of Daniel and Phillip 
Berrigan (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 168-170.  
81 Markey, 119. 
82 Ibid, 115. 
39 
 
array of ideas and interpretations than they had in the past under the tutelage of those 
such as Mother Columba.  
 The seeds of Maura’s more radical faith began to bloom when she arrived in 
Nicaragua’s capital of Managua in February 1970. Her experience in Siuna had primed 
Maura to think of Nicaragua as a second home and with the teachings of Medellín and 
Vatican II, she was now able to articulate grievances with the system that kept 
Nicaraguan citizens impoverished. More importantly, the urban environment of 
Nicaragua’s capital opened new opportunities for her to take part in civil disobedience. In 
her letters to her mother, Maura described the people of Managua’s slums as “waiting for 
the government to give them the land they promised” as they holed up in “one-room 
hovels, very dark and miserable.” Her letters recounted her experiences meeting with a 
group of protesting students and priests who took over a series of churches around the 
city – who US media had painted as “violent leftists.”83 Maura assured her mother that 
they were not “rioters,” but peaceful protestors standing up for human rights, showing 
that she had well-internalized the church’s new role as an activist body “committed to the 
poor and suffering, in contrast to the former image of a Church tied to the apron strings of 
a corrupt government.” She promised that she would stay out of such protests in the 
future but reasserted the need to support those who were willing to put their lives on the 
line for justice, as Jesus himself had done.84  
 Maura ultimately broke this promise, seeing it as a violation of her conscience to 
stand by and let the Somoza regime act uninhibited. Impressed by the dedication of 
Managua’s Catholic Youth Groups as they organized sit-ins around the country, Maura 
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quickly joined with Jesuit Father Fernando Cardenal, then the vice president of student 
affairs as the University of Central America (UCA) and helped him organize a national 
youth congress in León. As the Maryknoll delegate to the Confederation of Religious of 
Nicaragua (CONFER), she and Father Cardenal urged the organization to take the 
protests seriously, trying to get the more skeptical old-guard of Nicaragua’s clergy to put 
their support behind social change.85 While she and her sisters were originally sent to 
administer a clinic and lecture to school children, they had expanded their mission and 
began to see themselves as having common cause with the laity and clergy they came to 
know. They may have been sent to bring orthodoxy to “pagans,” but it is evident that the 
strain of Catholicism they encountered in the region converted them in kind.  
 By March 1973, Maura had developed a clear sense of class consciousness after 
witnessing the effects of the Managua earthquake, which caused a massive number of 
displaced victims to flood into the “Operacion Permanente de Emergencia Nacional” 
(OPEN), a shantytown built outside the city limits. By this point her writings lamented 
the “terrible injustices against the poor, the contrast of the very few rich having so much 
and the millions of poor not having the security of the next meal…”86 While Maura was 
no stranger to poverty and inequity, she no longer saw charity as the sole solution – the 
system had to be changed and the church ought to be a part of this change. In 1974, as a 
show of solidarity, Maura and several other Maryknollers openly supported the efforts of 
Amada Pineda, a campesina woman who was arrested by the National Guard and raped 
repeatedly while in custody under suspicion of being in a farmer’s union. Maura 
recounted going to court with her as a show of support as she sought to reveal the 
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injustices perpetuated by the National Guard – which Pineda told her were 
“innumerable.” In July 1976, she went even further and put her own body directly on the 
line against the National Guard. After a peaceful demonstration in OPEN was broken up 
by the regime, several youths were arrested and carted off into a National Guard Jeep. 
Maura, in a brazen display of defiance, threw herself in front of the car and smacked 
against its hood repeatedly, shouting “Let them go!” Surprised by her tenacity or perhaps 
anxious at the prospect of harming an American nun, the National Guard troops complied 
and let the protestors go free.87  
 Maura saw it as her role to fight for the rights of others on a theological basis, 
and she was not alone in this mindset. The Maryknollers took the struggle against 
Somoza personally as they saw the deteriorating conditions of their students and 
congregants, and even nuns and priests still within the United States began to directly 
fight against US intervention that had allowed his dictatorship to last for so long. In a 
1975 memo from their News Notes publication titled “Peyton’s Points of ‘Advising’ Your 
Senators and Representatives”, activist Maryknollers were given instructions on ways to 
approach politicians and legislators on issues of foreign policy. Among Peyton’s tips 
were to tout expertise – moral principles and personal contact with the suffering they 
hoped the politician might help alleviate. To be truly effective, one was to present 
themselves as a “resource” – to create an ongoing relationship with prospective allies. 
The memo warned that a single “loud” conflagration or “gotcha” moment might have a 
brief impact but limited future endeavors. He also recommended that speaking “for a 
committee or for a council” would stand out more to a prospective political ally than 
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“speaking for yourself.”88 This advice was not given in isolation but was indicative of a 
broad political movement that was growing out of unrest within Nicaragua. Somoza’s 
support came from the US, so his opposition knew it had to strike within the US as well.  
 The Heritage Foundation – a conservative think tank that advised the Reagan 
Administration – described the protests of the 1980s as a “cottage industry” that had 
grown out of pure suspicion and hostility to US foreign policy. Joan Frawley portrayed 
these activists as essentially being Marxist sympathizers seeking to “delegitimize” the 
Reagan administration and noted that many leaders of the anti-Contra movement came 
out of the Carter Administration - such as former ambassador to El Salvador Robert T. 
White of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA).89 With the 
understanding of the Maryknoll Society and their transformation over the years it’s clear 
that the seeds of the 1980s protest movement were planted before Reagan and were more 
than an expression of pre-existing partisan clashes. In their written history of their 
activities in Ciudad Sandino in Managua, Maryknoll sisters Peg Healy and Bea Zaragoza 
spoke to cooperation across international lines. As they worked to construct CEBs and 
prayer groups, they followed the model set out by Maryknoller Sister Marie Estelle 
Coupe as well as Nicaraguan Father José de la Jara.90 When Somoza was ousted by the 
revolutionaries in 1979, Sister Joan Uhlen wrote that she and her sisters would “never be 
the same people, our commitment has deepened, perhaps changed, our lives as religious 
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and as missionaries have altered permanently.”91 The commitment of the Nicaraguan 
people to fight and die for one another deeply inspired her and her sisters. This was not a 
mere partisan struggle, but a solidarity movement emerging from theological discourse 
between activists in Nicaragua and the US. Liberation Theology called on the faithful to 
oppose the societal sins inflicted by US foreign policy and so US missionaries decided 
that Central America was the place to turn theology into action. 
 The Maryknollers and other missionary activist groups sought to publicize the 
Nicaraguan struggle throughout the country during the 1970s and 1980s. In August 1978, 
as the revolution reached a fever pitch, the Maryknoll Justice and Peace Office sent out 
mailers to subscribers of their “Nicaragua Update” – addressed simply to “Friend of 
Nicaragua” – calling on the recipient to “add their voices” in solidarity with the “poor 
and oppressed.” As the State Department was planning its military aid packages to the 
Somoza regime that September, the mailer included a template for the recipient to write 
their own letter to Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, to make clear their 
opposition to the Somoza regime’s human rights violations and their “Christian concern” 
for the people of Nicaragua. The mailer concluded with a general call to “continue to 
work for his Kingdom of Love and Justice.”92  
 The Maryknollers initial missions were focused “purely” on spiritual matters – 
saving the souls of pagans and abetting the interests of US foreign policy in the name of 
bringing civilization to the world. The mission evolved over time – now it was to 
promote peace and help battle poverty. This meant opposing repressive regimes in their 
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host nations, such as Maura protesting the National Guard in Nicaragua, and raising 
awareness at home in the United States. In A Theology of Liberation, Gustavo Gutiérrez 
similarly cited a need to create God’s Kingdom on Earth, which would require a 
politicization of the faithful to combat repressive regimes and create a preferential option 
for the poor.93 The mission in Nicaragua then extended beyond just preaching to 
Nicaraguans, it meant improving their material conditions through political means. This 
required the Maryknollers to then proselytize to US citizens as an extension of their 
mission in Nicaragua. The protests against Somoza in Nicaragua – largely buoyed by 
religious activism and Liberation Theology – were extended to the United States through 
the connections built between American missionaries and their Central American 
counterparts and they would only intensify over time.  
   When Maura returned to the United States in the Fall of 1976 she not only 
continued to pray for the “tortured people who fight for justice today in the place of 
Christ,” but she dove into volunteering for “World Awareness Programs” with other 
missionaries to generate awareness of struggles occurring in “third world.”94 The 
Maryknollers used their broad reach and influence among American Catholics to 
generate awareness of global issues during the 1970s – all the way until the Sandinista 
victory in 1979. Through their various newsletters and monthly publication Maryknoll 
magazine the missionary order was able to reach hundreds of thousands of US Catholics 
as a trusted source of world news and serve as their first point of contact with global 
affairs.95 In 1970, they also began publishing theological texts under the imprint “Orbis 
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Books” whose literature included translations of works such as Guitierrez’s A Theology 
of Liberation, the writings of Ernesto Cardenal, and the religious musings of Sandinista 
co-founder and Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge.96  
 From September to October of 1978 their “News Notes” release called for 
normalized relations with Vietnam and reported on the worsening “impasse” in 
Nicaragua as tensions failed to thaw – recounting the failed efforts of Maryknoll Father 
Miguel D’Escoto to see any progress at an internationally mediated peace talk between 
President Somoza and the Broad Opposition Front (FAO). The following report made no 
specific mention of Nicaragua but instead included the ominous warnings of World Bank 
President Robert McNamara regarding the “most optimistic forecast… that 600 million 
people will be living at a standard beneath any reasonable definition of human decency in 
the year 2000.” Speaking to their audience in candidly class-conscious terms, the 
Maryknoll report criticized the “disturbing reluctance” of wealthy nations to “share more 
of the wealth they accrued largely through the resources and markets of the developing 
world.”97 While the Maryknollers of the 1950s were adulated as a worldwide spiritual 
army that could preserve and spread the glory of the United States’ civilization abroad, 
the Maryknollers of the 1970s felt it was their duty to educate the masses of the US for 
the betterment of the world. In another joint-statement signed by Maryknollers in concert 
with Catholic and Protestant mission directors in 1984, the signees rejected the narrative 
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of Nicaragua being part of an “East-West conflict between Communist and Western 
nations” and urged readers to see past Cold War propaganda. They instead hoped that 
with the common ground of Christianity, the people of the US and Nicaragua could reach 
“reconciliation, so that all parties concerned may move out of the valley of the shadow of 
death.”98 
 After the Sandinistas successfully deposed the Somoza regime in 1979 and 
began the task of reconstruction, Maryknollers by and large rejoiced and were jubilant 
about the possibilities going forward. Maura’s only regret was not being present in 1979 
when guerrillas took Managua.99 To make up for this absence, she returned to Managua 
in 1980 to celebrate the first anniversary of the revolution before traveling to El Salvador 
in hopes of seeing the FSLN’s success repeated.100 Other activists however kept their 
eyes narrowed squarely on Nicaragua, with the Maryknoll News Notes for May and June 
of 1979 warning readers that while Somoza had been defeated “a harder struggle begins.” 
Reconstruction, the report warned, would be just as difficult as military victory. The war 
had left the nation’s industry decimated and the Somoza regime had left the coffers 
empty as they fled. Even more dangerous though was the threat of future conflict arising 
from “those who established Somoza’s empire – right wing businessmen and the U.S. 
government.” While the US government called for a “moderate” government to take 
reigns of Nicaragua and the World Bank would require “Belt Tightening” for any 
monetary assistance, the Maryknollers warned their readers that the issues at hand 
required more than moderate solutions. “For Nicaraguans the belt cannot be tightened.” 
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The News Note ended with a call to action – directing readers to the national Network in 
Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People, directed in part by Archbishop Sergio Mendez of 
Cuernavaca, Mexico.101 The Nicaraguan Revolution was sure enough not yet completed, 
and the efforts of religious activists to oppose US intervention were not through either. 
The solidarity networks built by the likes of the Maryknollers and other US activists 
would continue operation well into the 1980s and in fact grew as the task of opposing the 
Contras – funded by the Reagan Administration – took on an even greater urgency than 
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Chapter 2: Anti-Contra and Anti-War: Faith and Protest in the 1980s 
Liberation Theology and Information Networks 
The challenges that faced the “Third World” in the 1980s were self-evident to 
religious officials in the United States. Liberation Theology is traditionally seen as a 
“Third World” response to issues of oppression, poverty, and capitalism due to its Latin 
American origins, but its effects were indeed felt abroad in the United States. The global 
nature of Catholicism meant that events such as the Nicaraguan Revolution and the 
assassination of Archbishop Romero could not go unnoticed by the broader clergy even 
within the heart of American empire.102 The activist example set by the likes of the 
Nicaraguan CEBs and the Maryknollers during the 1970s prompted clergy and laity alike 
to reevaluate the role of the church and many sought to “keep up” with the spirit of 
Medellín. In a 1983 interview with the National Catholic Review, Sister Marie Augusta 
Neal, professor of sociology at Emmanuel College in Cambridge, reflected that 
theologians of the 1950s followed the currents of consumerism and uncritically “closed 
the shelter door” on the poor due to fears of resource scarcity. As the world’s population 
only increased, theologians of the 1970s and 1980s had to re-evaluate this perspective to 
meet humanitarian demands. Resources were not scarce, she argued, but had to be used in 
a different way. Neal defined Liberation Theology’s purpose as allowing “the poor [to 
reach out] and take what’s rightfully theirs.” While the Third World had already begun to 
 
102 Tim Golden, “Salvador Officers Named as Killers in U.N. Report,” The New Times (New York, NY), March 
15, 1993. A rightwing death squad assassinated Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero as he gave 
mass in a hospital chapel. A 1993 UN Truth Commission found that the assassination was planned by 
Roberto d’Aubuisson, a former National Guard major working with government security forces to silence 
Romero as he urged soldiers to disobey their superiors and cease attacks on civilians. D’Aubuisson and the 
National Guard were both supported by the Reagan administration, and the Commission found the 
administration had knowingly ignored his involvement in the assassination. 
49 
 
understand this new purpose for their faith, she felt the true challenge was teaching the 
First World how to respond properly.103 Revolution and liberation indeed seemed to be 
well on the horizon, and the new task of US clergy was to help this message reach a 
North American audience. In a sense, the United States was once more “mission 
territory.”  
 The Sandinista victory was followed by a brief period of peace and 
reconstruction, thanks in large part to the FSLN’s broad coalition which included 
traditionally right-wing forces within the Church and private sector. The Sandinista 
government was also successful diplomatically in securing aid and positive relations with 
several western capitalist nations, earning praise for their relative flexibility in the midst 
of the Cold War.104 Journalist and historian George Black overall describes this period of 
good feelings and flexibility as a “honeymoon” however, which could not last so long as 
Nicaragua’s reactionary bourgeoise refused to accept “the rules of the game” inherent to 
the post-revolutionary order.105 Conservative elites within Nicaragua wished for a return 
to the pre-revolutionary status-quo and found a fast ally within the Reagan 
administration. Following from a long history of US intervention, the Reagan 
administration and the CIA began a massive operation funding and aiding the Contras – 
counter-revolutionary forces dedicated to ousting the Sandinistas from power. As a result, 
Reagan’s State Department soon found itself at odds with a massive protest movement 
running counter to the United States’ interventionist aims in Nicaragua that was built 
 
103 Cited by Arthur Jones, “Liberation Theology: First World Response to Industrial Capitalism,” National 
Catholic Review, October 7th, 1983, Box 5, Folder 8 (Jesuits), Central American Historical Institute Records, 
1980-1993, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, 1-2. 
104 Black, 300. 
105 Ibid, 184-188. 
50 
 
from an alliance between secular and religious forces. The ensuing grassroots movement 
harried the Reagan administration’s foreign policy efforts across the 1980s and sought to 
educate regular citizens on current events in Latin America to mobilize them in protest of 
the US government. 
 Using connections forged during missions in Central America, religious 
organizers in the US began to link forces North and South to create an information 
network that sought to counter the State Department’s intelligence and propaganda. With 
the broad umbrella of Christian faith and humanitarianism, protestors and activists were 
able to pierce Cold War politics and engage in open acts of cooperation even with radical 
counterparts in Central America. This movement stretched even beyond the Catholic 
context and into the Protestant world at times. The Managua-based Evangelical 
Committee for Aid Development (CEPAD) for instance received open financial support 
from the Protestant National Council of Churches (NCC) in the US despite CEPAD’s 
loose support for the new revolutionary government.106 The NCC similarly helped fund 
the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) as they performed research 
that ran counter to Reagan’s State Department. The Washington office on Latin America 
(WOLA) likewise received funding from both Catholic and Protestant denominations 
alike, with its office located in a United Methodist Church during the 1980s.107  
 While these organizations were relatively secular bodies, religious organizations 
saw a righteous cause in their opposition to US foreign policy. Groups like NACLA and 
WOLA became trusted sources for many US Catholic newspapers during the 1970s and 
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1980s as their critiques of Reagan’s Latin American policy made the pages of even small 
local papers such as the Catholic Advance in Kansas108 and the Catholic Messenger in 
Iowa.109 Sandinista Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge also invited several religious 
delegations from US orders and denominations such as the Maryknollers and 
Presbyterian missionaries to survey their progress in reconstruction and stand witness to 
their human rights record.110  These groups not only took this role in stride, but expanded 
it and took it on themselves to cast that same watchful eye on the Reagan administration. 
Religious organizations thus cast a wide net, funding and connecting researchers in the 
US with counterparts in Latin America so they could create their own media circuit to 
educate the faithful on matters of US foreign policy, which in turn could generate protest 
and civil disobedience. 
A major figure in this budding information network that perhaps best displayed 
this spirit of cooperation was the Central American Historical Institute (CAHI) situated in 
the Jesuit-run Georgetown University, partner to the Instituto Historico Centroamericano 
(IHCA) which operated out of the Jesuit University of Central America (UCA) in 
Managua. The ICHA initially began work in 1981 under the umbrella of the Jesuit order 
as a center of journalistic research, analysis, communication, and activism aimed at 
carrying out the preferential option for the poor that stood as the centerpiece of liberation 
theology. From its offices in Managua the IHCA became an important international 
source broadcasting the pro-Sandinista Christian viewpoint, and its newsletter Envío was 
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published worldwide in three different languages.111 While not directly affiliated with the 
Sandinista government, the IHCA was unapologetic in its view that revolution could be a 
Christian process that served an extension of faith – a point of view well-illustrated 
through an IHCA publication portraying an armed guerrilla in the shadow of a martyred 
Christ (see Figure 1).112 
 
Figure 1: Christian Faith and Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua 
CAHI represented a true spirit of cooperation between US and Nicaraguan 
activists and protestors, with Catholic organizers north and south facilitating its inception. 
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While the organization was secular and operated by Elizabeth (“Betsy”) Cohn, previously 
a member of the nonprofit Oxfam, and currently a professor of US foreign policy at 
American University in Washington DC, the influence of Catholic activism was apparent 
in its foundation. In 1981, US Jesuit Peter Marchetti arranged for fellow Jesuit priest and 
then Sandinista Secretary of Education Fernando Cardenal to meet with US-based 
activists in Boston. It was here that Marchetti introduced Cardenal to Cohn and connected 
her to a network of researchers and activists in Central America who proved pivotal to 
her work in the coming years, as Marchetti encouraged her to establish an office in 
Washington DC that would serve as the US counterpart to the IHCA in Nicaragua. 
Following the suggestion in February 1982, Cohn made an initial trip to DC to consider 
the matter with similar activists and researchers in the field, including members of 
WOLA and the US Catholic Conference. Once she was satisfied that the endeavor would 
not be “redundant,” she moved to Washington DC the following month and set up the 
headquarters of CAHI in a 10ft-by-10ft office donated by Georgetown University in their 
Intercultural Center.113 
CAHI was a small operation, consisting of Cohn, an administrative assistant, and 
a student intern. Their goal was to be an independent source of news, data, and 
information not affiliated with the US or Nicaraguan governments. Their connections to 
researchers in Nicaragua through the IHCA allowed them access to steady news stream 
regarding events in Central America, which they put out in their weekly publication 
dubbed Update – a simple and “low-cost” publication focused purely on getting out news 
and information without the need for any gloss. CAHI provided information and data on 
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regional affairs to Members of Congress, journalists, and academics alike during the 
1980s and served as a useful hub of information for many sources reporting on news and 
issues in the revolution’s aftermath.114 Cohn also produced a series of chronologies 
regarding US relations and operations within Nicaragua and Honduras. These 
chronologies consisted of three columns aiming to educate readers on US operations 
abroad, focusing on Official Policies of the State Department, activities of the CIA and 
US military, and finally a column on the more recent history of the Contra War and the 
US government’s involvement with the counterrevolutionaries.115 As Nicaragua was 
previously an obscure place in the mind of most American’s, groups like CAHI attempted 
to create clear historical narratives and efficiently relay current events. Their content was 
scarcely religious, but religious organizations were willing to act as benefactors due to a 
shared anti-imperialist cause. 
Update reported on a broad range of social and political issues in Nicaragua and 
sought to give context to the country’s situation as it formed a new government 
altogether. In January 1983 for instance, they released a report on the state of political 
parties and electoral reform as the Special Commission of Nicaragua’s Council of State 
began to draft proposals laying out the rights and responsibilities of political parties. As 
the report argued, Nicaragua’s traditional political parties had historically been minority 
parties without large representation. They primarily operated through coalition and often 
had fewer than 2,000 members. While partisan organizing was important, recent laws at 






committees – such as a Housing Law that had been discussed just a few days prior on the 
26th of the month. The Law of Political Parties was even to be discussed by neighborhood 
committees that following February. The letter concluded that Nicaraguan democracy 
was evolving along two paths: “traditional political parties and that of grassroots 
organization” and surmised that political parties were not likely to remain as dominant as 
they once had been.116 Democracy was new to Nicaragua, and it would take a form 
unique to Nicaragua. Rather than urge intervention, CAHI and similar interest groups 
sought to provide context for current events and urged the US to allow the nation to 
develop on its own course. 
As the White House amped up its critiques of the upcoming elections that next 
year, accusing the Sandinistas of plotting fraud or despotism, CAHI was ready to argue 
that their accusations were made in bad faith. In a 1984 statement, CAHI argued that the 
Sandinistas had taken every step to prepare for elections since 1981 and pointed out that 
local elections had already taken place. All opposition groups “living in Nicaragua” 
(likely a reference to the Contras hiding out in neighboring Honduras), moreover, had 
agreed to participate in the electoral process.117 The staff of CAHI seemed to have a sense 
despite these points that arguing the legitimacy of Nicaragua’s elections with the US 
government would be a lost cause. One staffer’s personal notes remarked that the US 
scarcely was concerned with the legitimacy (or lack therein) of elections in Mexico or El 
Salvador, and that the US government never cared to intervene when Somoza imprisoned 
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or assassinated his political rivals. They concluded that the State Department would 
declare that “Nica elections are not acceptable. Because they are Nica.” The FSLN would 
likely win the election due to their wide base of support, and the Reagan administration 
would go on to “pick another issue” to justify support for the Contras.118 
From her office in Georgetown and with her contacts that the Jesuits and IHCA 
helped her forge in Nicaragua, Cohn and CAHI played an important role in keeping the 
public informed on events in Central America and exposing the often-illegal activities of 
the US government and the Contras. On June 30th, 1984, Robert Parry of the Associated 
Press (AP) published a major story regarding a “comic book style manual” created by the 
CIA and distributed in Nicaragua by the Contras. The comic book encouraged readers to 
destabilize the country and delegitimize the FSLN’s government through various acts of 
sabotage, ranging from simple actions such as “calling in sick to work”, to more extreme 
activities such as pouring sand into engines, to full acts of violent terrorism such as 
hurling Molotov cocktails to burn down buildings. The pamphlet was initially found by 
peasants along the Honduran border in Ocotal after a Contra attack in June that year and 
came to the Associated Press’s attention through Cohn’s efforts and connections. Parry 
and the AP were able to verify its origins within the CIA through their own US 
intelligence sources. While the Reagan Administration claimed they had no intent to 
overthrow the Sandinistas, the US-produced book was riddled with calls-to-action that 
urged Nicaraguans to do whatever they could to tear down the FSLN’s government. 
Through its illustrations, the manual encouraged readers to cut telephone lines, make 
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false reservations for planes and hotels, to destroy vehicles, free animals into the streets, 
steal food and other supplies, and destroy electrical systems across the country (even 
including visual instructions on how to simply short-circuit a factory’s operations with 
just a coin). This was all despite the CIA’s claims that the rebels they supported were to 
refrain from attacks on noncombatants or “economic targets.”119 
This story was just the start of what became known as the “Contra-Gate” scandal 
as Robert Parry, along with his partner Brian Barger, dedicated the better part of the 
decade reporting on events in Nicaragua and frequently contradicting the Reagan 
Administration’s claims in the process. Their reporting ultimately uncovered much worse 
than the sabotage manual – finding a second CIA manual that specifically gave the 
Contras instructions on how to assassinate civilian officials. While their editors held back 
many of these stories, they ultimately broke the story at the heart of the “Iran-Contra” 
scandal, with US general Oliver North illegally aiding the shipment of arms and 
munitions to the Sandinistas in violation of the Boland Amendment. While the Reagan 
Administration was successful in leveraging influence over AP and other sources that 
delayed and downplayed these stories, reporters like Barger and Parry were able to 
uncover many of the Contras’ human rights abuses and the ways in which the US had 
been illegally aiding them.120 While often unseen, Christian organizers were frequently 
involved in facilitating the connections that allowed these stories to come to light to 
generate protest against the Reagan administration. 
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The efforts of activists such as Cohn under the banners of organizations like 
CAHI, WOLA, and NACLA allowed the stories of violence and struggle in Nicaragua to 
become suddenly domestic news as the interventionist activities of the US came to light. 
The deaths of American volunteers in particular such as Benjamin Linder, killed during a 
Contra attack on a hydroelectric dam, suddenly took on a darker tenor with revelations 
about the CIAs training manuals.121 The horrific stories of victims like Dora López, who 
lost her 10-month old son Marlon during a Contra assault on her way to a clinic, became 
an indictment of the US government as she told her story to an indifferent Congress that 
had voted to fund the Contras as “humanitarian aid” and was planning to do so again.122 
Clear in CAHI’s notes and Parry’s interviews were a frustration with their inability to 
move people and policy with the truth alone though. More than just words and data, the 
anti-Contra movement needed a strong foundation to push people into action, and 
religious forces were decisive in providing this foundation. The Catholic Church 
animated people to protest and dissidence in Nicaragua during the revolution and it 
would do so again in the United States during the Contra War.  
The Church as an Anti-War Institution 
The anti-Contra movement found little headway and little use in merely pointing 
out the crimes and abuses of the Reagan administration’s interventionist policy. 
Repeatedly, the White House and CIA would shrug, deny, and push aside all accusations 
levied against them. Instead, these information networks would have to run counter to the 
State Department and encourage grassroots action by reaching out to people directly, and 
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their connections with church groups and religious activists provided them a wide net to 
reach a committed audience. In the December of 1980, Sister Maura Clarke of the 
Maryknoll Society and three other missionary women were found dead, murdered by a 
death squad in El Salvador. Incensed by the loss of their sister, the Maryknollers began to 
mobilize a mass lobbying campaign against US foreign policy. The possibility that US 
taxpayers were indirectly supporting the death squads that killed US citizens inspired an 
unexpected backlash, where previously missionaries had served the interest of the US 
State Department. One particularly evocative rallying cry to come out of Maura’s death 
was “U.S. Guns Kill U.S. Nuns.” Tip O’Neill and many of Reagan’s opponents in 
Congress were willing to take up this cause, and the White House found itself bombarded 
by a letter writing campaign that dwarfed even the protest letters that followed the Iran 
Hostage Crisis.123  
The Maryknoll society was not alone, and the lobbying campaign against the 
Contras found support from across US institutions. Three years after the event, the Akron 
Beacon Journal continued to report updates on the story, quoting former ambassador to El 
Salvador Robert White’s belief that the assassinations had been ordered from the 
Salvadoran government as “it would have been a simple matter for Salvadoran authorities 
to punish the soldiers quickly” otherwise.124 The Oakland Tribune similarly reported on 
the arrests of “enlisted men” a year after the murders, and included the headline 
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“Salvadoran conspiracy is hinted” as more evidence pointed towards the killers acting on 
orders from the Salvadoran military.125 
The broader Catholic hierarchy also came out in opposition to US military action 
in Central America. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops wrote numerous 
letters to the White House, Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, and Congress during the 
1980s urging “expanded diplomatic and political measures as the morally acceptable and 
politically realistic way of addressing the serious problems affecting U.S.-Nicaragua 
relations.” They not only opposed all military aid to the Contras but also opposed 
economic embargoes on the nation that sought to aggravate and immiserate it further to 
undermine the Sandinista’s new government.126 They penned similar letters regarding the 
escalating tensions in El Salvador, where rightwing assassins murdered Archbishop 
Oscar Arnulfo Romero in much the same way as sister Maura. The USCCB framed their 
opposition to US military intervention as honoring Romero’s legacy and his own 
missives of peace to President Jimmy Carter years earlier.127 As repressive regimes 
widened their crosshairs to include holy men and women, Catholic leadership and 
ultimately the public began to take notice. 
Maura and her sisters used their return trips to the US well and organized several 
workshops and awareness programs as Maura served on the “Global Awareness Team” 
during her stay in Boston in 1978 on behalf of the Archdioses. Informing “middle-class 
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Catholics” of the deleterious effects of imperialism through lectures, discussions, and 
group exercises was of utmost importance to the missionaries on their time off. Maura 
also shared books published by Orbis with family and friends whenever possible – 
principally translations of Latin American texts on Liberation Theology such as Ernesto 
Cardenal’s The Gospel of Solentiname. While many in the diocese were supportive of 
these awareness campaigns as an extension of protests against the Vietnam war, many 
remained hesitant due to the more radical character of Maura and the Maryknollers’ anti-
imperialist critiques.128 Maura and company did not merely urge peace, they actively 
pursued solidarity and communication with the “enemy” – the supposed communists who 
were on the receiving end of horrific violence promoted by the US government. 
The backlash against this violence was fierce as protestors took to the streets in 
rallies opposing a massive Contra-aid package put to Congress in 1986. While the 
popular opposition to US Contra-aid originated largely through Catholic ties, it grew into 
an interfaith alliance of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious officials. These 
activists banded together to form a human cross on the Capitol steps on March 5, 1986 in 
honor of those who died in Nicaragua as a part of the Reagan administration’s pursuit of 
“terrorism” over diplomacy. The organizers of the protest feared that Contra-aid was part 
of a broader propaganda effort to prime the country for more extreme military 
intervention in the vein of Vietnam and carried crosses inscribed with the names of dead 
Nicaraguan civilians killed by the Contras. Catholic Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton of 
Detroit referred to the government’s defamation of the Nicaraguan Revolution as a 
“distortion campaign” that ignored Sandinista peace efforts and sought to hide the human 
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rights abuses of the Somozistas and the Contras. The group collectively included twenty-
one Roman Catholic, Methodist, Episcopal, and Lutheran Bishops who signed a 
statement to “stop the lies, stop the killing.”129 Anger and dissatisfaction ran high as anti-
Contra protestors not only feared their government was supporting atrocity abroad, but 
that it would escalate the situation to the point of outright invasion.  
The contra-aid package ultimately passed in Congress, but this failure did not 
slow down the protests. In November 1986, over 5,000 demonstrators marched through 
Los Angeles to protest US involvement in Nicaragua and El Salvador – the largest 
demonstration against a foreign policy decision ever within the city. The protest was 
organized by an alliance of around 100 different religious, labor, and political groups and 
the demonstrators similarly carried white crosses inscribed with the names of civilians 
killed in the two Central American countries. James Lawson, president of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference who was present for the protest, characterized the 
foreign policy efforts of Reagan’s White House as trying to keep Central America a 
“plantation, rather than recognize the people there as people who want dignity and 
freedom, now.” The Los Angeles protestors similarly feared a repeat of Vietnam, 
worrying the situation would escalate beyond a proxy war and that their own children 
would be sent off to fight and die. Like Maura Clarke and the Maryknollers, some of the 
demonstrators had personally witnessed the violence in Central America that the US had 
stoked. One such protestor was Father Michael McFadden who claimed that he “…saw 
first-hand what those bombs and bullets can do. And I’m doing everything I can now to 
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make that truth known.”130 What began as missionary connections abroad became a 
humanitarian campaign aiming the faithful against US foreign policy and military 
aggression. 
The Sandinista government welcomed the efforts of these Christian organizations, 
and US religious leaders had surprising levels of access to the FSLN as a result. When 
American pilot Eugene Hasenfus was shot down over Nicaragua on October 5th while 
carrying weapon shipments for the contras, it was Reverend Joseph Lowery of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference who was invited to Managua to discuss his 
trial with Sandinista Justice Minister Rodrigo Reyes. Lowery characterized the visit as 
nothing more than a “fact finding” mission to make sure Hasenfus was treated properly as 
opposed to a negotiation to have him released. Hasenfus’s actual lawyer, former U.S. 
Attorney General Griffin Bell, was shut down when he asked to speak with his client as 
he was “already viewed as an agent of the American government” by Nicaraguan 
officials.131 The US government and its agents were a hostile presence, but Christian 
officials had gained a heightened degree of moral legitimacy to the revolutionaries due to 
the impacts of Liberation Theology, both in Nicaragua and the US.  
Sister Maura and her fellow missionaries enjoyed the friendship of the Somozas 
in the 1960s, but the situation had changed dramatically. In China, Mao viewed US 
missionaries as spies and agents of the US government; the Sandinistas and their 
sympathizers in contrast saw US missionaries as potential allies and points-of-contact. 
Religious leaders like Lowery interpreted their role as peacekeeper and mediator, who 
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could hopefully push back against the excesses of US imperialism while still ensuring 
that the Nicaraguan government operated transparently and in good faith. Nicaraguan 
courts sentenced Hasenfus to 30 years for his role in smuggling weapons, but President 
Daniel Ortega had him pardoned shortly afterwards and he was sent back to the U.S. on 
December 17th the same year after a series of negotiations with U.S. senator Chris Dodd. 
According to Ortega, Hasenfus was a “victim” of American imperialism as well, and he 
requested that the Nicaraguan congress release him as a “birthday gift” to Hasenfus’s son. 
The US State Department alleged this was a mere exercise in propaganda to distract from 
other abuses, and it spoke to a successful strategy of public relations where the FSLN 
played to a sense of moral high ground to maintain alliances with NGOs within the 
United States.132 
Sanctuary and Solidarity  
As mass demonstrations still failed to move foreign policy, with the Reagan 
Administration changing tactics to fund the Contras through illegal means when pressed 
by opposition, many protestors turned to direct action, often defying the law in the 
process. Christian activists of all stripes in the United States played a massive role in the 
nascent Sanctuary Movement during the 1980s in addition to their work in lobbying 
against Contra-funds and mobilizing mass demonstrations. The Sanctuary Movement 
focused its efforts principally on providing support, shelter, and defense for refugees 
escaping violence – particularly those fleeing Central America. The “Dirty Wars” of 
Latin America saw massive displacement and migration during the latter half of the 20th 
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century. The civil war in Guatemala alone saw between 500,000 to 1 million of the 
nation’s indigenous Mayans displaced from the 1960s all the way until the early 1990s.133 
The violence and instability in Nicaragua during the revolution that continued into the 
Contra War only worsened the situation in Central America as thousands of Nicaraguans 
fled into neighboring Costa Rica and Honduras, prompting Nicaraguan and Costa Rican 
authorities to cooperate in 1988 to better control movements at the border.134 This 
experience was shared across most of the region. A 1987 newsletter from the National 
Interfaith Action Network (also known as IMPACT) informed readers that the Civil War 
in El Salvador had taken 62,000 lives since 1979 and that in spite of this bloodshed, the 
US government continued to send refugees back into the warzone – the Reagan 
administration claiming that most Salvadorans were arriving in the US for “solely 
economic” causes and thus not qualified for refugee status.135 With an increased 
consciousness of the effects of US foreign policy on Latin America, activists and 
protestors felt it imperative to not just protest the government’s policies but outright 
challenge them. While IMPACT provided readers with forms to mail to representatives 
and senators regarding the ongoing refugee crisis, other activists would take the issue into 
their own hands. 
A July 1984 mailer from the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America 
noted that interest in the Sanctuary Movement had grown to such an extent that they had 
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to alter their organizational structure to save costs – requesting that subscribers fill out a 
special form with a $15 donation to indicate that they would prefer to keep up to date on 
all new publications regarding ongoing events and not just general mailings. The same 
newsletter also included updates on several ongoing cases of activists involved in the 
movement and their challenges. Jack Elder for instance had been arrested by Federal 
officers at “Casa Oscar Romero” in San Benito, Texas – indicted with three counts of 
“transporting.” Sister Diane Muhlenkamp faced similar charges but had “filed for a pre-
trial diversion” which set her apart from Elder and fellow activist Stacey Lynn Merkt, 
who was in the process of appealing a 2 year probation. The newsletter expressed a 
triumphant tone despite these legal troubles, touting that they had reached 100 sanctuaries 
last March with the Excot family “safe and sound” and that this number grew to 150 
sanctuaries merely by June of the same year. While the Contras and Nicaragua go 
unmentioned, the origins of the movement are clear - the mailers final lines thanking 
subscribers for their aid in “stopping U.S intervention in Central America.”136 More so 
than awareness campaigns or mass demonstrations, the sanctuary movement put 
Christian activists into direct confrontation with the law and authorities in a manner not 
unlike Christian activists in Latin America who many cited as inspirations. Central 
American foreign policy served as a point of radicalization for many US Christians and 
they made it a political battleground in their crusade for social justice. 
In the Fall of 1984, the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia 
opened the National Sanctuary Defense Fund (NSDF) for the purpose of providing legal 
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defense to sanctuary workers and refugees in addition to raising public awareness on the 
“moral and legal issues involved in the sanctuary movement.” To this end, they sought to 
raise $850,000 to support Sanctuary workers. Symbolizing the interfaith nature of this 
movement, the Quaker organization later passed control of the project to the Franciscan 
Friars of California in 1985, which allowed the fund to maintain a tax-exempt status. The 
friars maintained the account that received the organization’s funds and allocated them 
based on the recommendations of the NSDF’s board of directors, made up of 7 activists 
from a variety of different states.137 The movement’s religious foundation gave it not only 
a stance of moral legitimacy but also provided financial advantages.  
The legal jeopardy that Sanctuary workers faced was daunting, but they 
recognized civil disobedience as a moral and spiritual imperative to help those in need. 
One such worker, Peggy Hutchison, wrote in the United Methodist Reporter that her 
involvement in the “underground railroad” of the Sanctuary Movement was her personal 
“Christian Mission.” As part of her journey, she carefully studied immigration law to 
familiarize herself with the specific laws she was challenging, before determining that the 
answer to her struggle was in scripture, not any legal code. The Old Testament told the 
faithful to treat “foreigners living in your land… as you would a fellow Israelite.” To 
remain inactive in the movement to protect refugees would be equivalent to collaboration 
with “the United State government which helped sponsor the torture of thousands of 
people; I could learn to live with atrocity, or, I could stand with the pressed and 
persecuted Salvadorans and Guatemalans.” While Peggy’s story was published in a 
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Methodist news outlet and her personal denomination goes unmentioned, she lauded the 
refugees from Central America for their “phenomenal” understanding of gospel and 
scripture and thanked them for helping her truly “understand liberation brought about by 
Good News in a much deeper way.”138 As Gustavo Gutiérrez laid out in his A Theology 
of Liberation, the process of liberation was one of action. The “denunciation of social 
injustices” required the Church and the faithful to actively disentangle themselves from 
social orders that inflicted injustice, less it be even passively involved.139 Liberation 
theology, which played a massive part in struggles for civil liberties and justice in Central 
America, continued to play a role in the struggle for justice in North America for 
Catholics and Protestants alike even if it came through indirect or interpersonal sources. 
As the United States government inserted itself into the political happenings of the region 
and asserted influence, it was influenced in kind by the social currents that had prompted 
said intervention. The same forces that animated protests in the south moved north and 
continued to drive dissident movements. 
In August 1988, sanctuary workers won an important legal case in Albuquerque 
when journalist Demetria Martinez of the National Catholic Reporter and Lutheran 
minister Rev. Glen Remer-Thamert were acquitted by a federal jury on charges of 
illegally bringing two pregnant Salvadoran women into the United States. The defendants 
in the case reportedly wept in the aftermath of the trial, as they had been certain they 
were going to be tried guilty. After the trial, Remer-Thamert expressed his hope that “all 
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of us, both Democrats and Republicans, will care enough to work for change in U.S. 
policy in Central America so that diplomacy and peace will prevail.” While Martinez had 
previously denied any role in the Sanctuary Movement, she expressed after the trial her 
hope that American journalists would “redouble their efforts to the cover the war in El 
Salvador, our government’s role in that war and the victims of that war.” The attorneys 
involved were especially hopeful that the victory gave a path forward for the appeal of 
eight different sanctuary workers who had been convicted in Tuscon two years earlier. A 
notable facet of the case was the introduction of “international treaties signed by the 
United States and a short-lived declaration of New Mexico as a ‘sanctuary state’,” which 
the movement utilized as a justification for the activists’ actions.140  
In this respect, the Sanctuary Movement long outlasted the antiwar and anti-
intervention movement that it was originally derived from; in March 2021 the Center for 
Immigration Studies, a conservative think-tank, defined “sanctuary jurisdictions” as 
cities, counties, and states that had “laws, ordinances, regulations, resolutions, policies, or 
other practices that obstruct immigration enforcement.” According to their metrics, 11 
states could potentially be counted as sanctuaries in their entirety, while hundreds of 
cities and counties across the country from nearly 30 different states similarly qualified, 
showing a strong and lasting impact of the movement since its origins in Christian 
organizing.141 Although the religious connotations of the Sanctuary movement faded into 
the 21st century, the core of its message and focus on Central American refugees remain. 
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Mass organization prompted mass response. Although not to nearly the same extreme as 
counterparts in Nicaragua or El Salvador, conservative forces in the US government and 
law enforcement began their own counter operations to undermine and combat this new 
current of liberal Christian activism. 
Government Response 
 These direct acts of disobedience put religious activists in the crosshairs of the 
Reagan administration and law enforcement as the growing anti-intervention movement 
came to blows with what they saw as an unjust order. It eventually came to light that the 
FBI made it a practice in the 1980s to monitor and spy on activists challenging US policy 
in Central America, in addition to engaging in general acts of “political harassment” 
according to the Movement Support Network (part of the Center for Constitutional Rights 
and the National Lawyer’s guild). As the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El 
Salvador (CISPES) uncovered through a series of FOIA requests, the FBI had monitored 
them for 5 years in a massive operation that involved 52 of the FBI’s 59 field offices 
across the US. In an unsuccessful bid to charge CISPES as an unregistered agent of a 
foreign government, FBI agents infiltrated CISPES meetings, created lists of members, 
and monitored their protest events. When they failed to find any evidence of wrongdoing 
after two years, they closed the operation only to reopen it under even more serious 
grounds, claiming the investigation a matter of Foreign Counterintelligence and 
International Terrorism as they falsely charged CISPES with running guerrilla training 
camps in the US for Salvadoran refugees. In a bid to find any evidence of overlap 
between CISPES and any such foreign espionage, they expanded their investigation to 
over 2,000 groups over the course of 5 years on the grounds that any organization which 
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collaborated with CISPES could be a potential “front” through which they operated.142 
Any hypothetical wrongdoing from one organization could potentially be used as 
ammunition against any affiliated group. According to CISPES’s findings, the United 
Auto Workers, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Knights of Columbus, and 
several members of Congress all fell under the aegis of the investigation despite the lack 
of any actual evidence uncovered – a scope which indicated to them an “illegal campaign 
to stifle dissent.”143 
 The church indeed provided resources and a massive base for the anti-intervention 
movement to utilize within the United States, but they did not provide an all-
encompassing protection. The reins of power still rested firmly in the hands of the White 
House and State Department as they utilized law enforcement as a cudgel against 
protestors. As one FBI memo from New Orleans described, it was “imperative at this 
time to formulate some plan of attack against CISPES and specifically against individuals 
who defiantly display their contempt for the US government by making speeches and 
propagandizing their cause.” To further defame the organization, agents such as Frank 
Varelli, who infiltrated the Dallas branch of CISPES, were told to “disrupt the 
organization by suggesting violent tactics and planting rumors.”144 Although the FBI was 
not successful in destroying CISPES or proving accusations of terrorism or espionage 
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within the larger movement, they suffered little consequence for what amounted to a 
massive and politically charged campaign of harassment and defamation.  
 Director of the FBI William Sessions ultimately described the CISPES probe as 
an “aberration – an unfortunate aligning of mistakes in judgement at several levels that 
cumulatively led to an investigation of which the FBI is not proud.” His testimonies 
ultimately sought to shift the blame to informants such as Varelli, whose “unreliable” 
intelligence was used as the cornerstone for building the case. Sessions went on to claim 
that the Bureau would begin initiating reforms to ensure that investigations did not again 
infringe on civil rights145, and the FBI soon followed up with the offer to have the names 
of individuals and groups gathered in the investigation removed from the bureau’s 
records “on a case-by-case basis.”146 Critics seemed skeptical; one political cartoon from 
the Central America Report showed a group of FBI agents lining up for slaps on the 
wrist, with a superior chiding them “Bad Agents!” (Figure 2).147 Another cartoon from 
the Los Angeles Times simply showed Sessions looking into a mirror and seeing J. Edgar 
Hoover in his reflection with a thumbs up (Figure 3).148 Sessions remained secure in his 
office until his retirement in 1993 – suffering only a minor speedbump in his career as a 
result. CISPES was not dealt any sort of lethal blow, but they suffered one of a thousand 
cuts that their movement endured during the Reagan era. 
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 The anti-intervention movement struck a nerve in the hearts of US conservatives. 
In opposing the dogma of anticommunist doctrine and freely associating with activists 
from Nicaragua, on the opposite end of the Iron Curtain, they put themselves into the 
crosshairs of a massive conservative defamation campaign. The additional layer of 
theology made it no simple task to portray the movement as seditious, as they counted 
among their number bishops, priests, nuns, reverends, rabbis, and many more respected 
theologians. The regular rules of the Cold War and McCarthyism did not seem to apply to 
Central America, which caused the political establishment to re-adapt its strategies. What 
resulted from this campaign was a tug-of-war during the 1980s over the hearts and minds 
of the religious rank-and-file. The Reagan White House and conservative Christians took 
the effects of Liberation Theology very seriously and began work on a project to realign 
the nation’s understanding of Christian identity to a patriotic one – one that would 
undermine the effects of Liberation Theology in the US and put Christian activists on the 
defensive while the State Department continued clandestine operations that further 




Figure 2: "Bad Agents" - Central America Report 
 






Chapter 3: Conservative Counterattack: The Tug of War 
Media Responses 
 Theological trends from Latin America played a massive role in the anti-
interventionist movement and Sanctuary movements of the 1980s, but reactions to 
Liberation Theology in the United States were not universal. The movement of 
Liberation Theology northward through missionary groups and the ensuing grassroots 
protests created much concern among conservative Christians, Catholic and Protestant, 
who largely supported the Reagan administration. Conservative Christian activists then 
coordinated heavily to discredit their leftwing and liberal counterparts through the media 
and political campaigning to alter the narrative on US involvement in Latin America. 
Liberation Theology and the anti-intervention protests of the 1980s revealed deep rifts 
within the discourse of US Christendom as both factions engaged in a brutal tug-of-war 
over the support of the religious rank-and-file. The rightwing counterattack against the 
Liberation Theology moreover belied the strength of its effects; conservative political 
strategists and media figures coordinated strong and sustained efforts to discredit and 
delegitimize left and liberal Christianity as valid politically and theologically in a way 
that revealed serious concern over its potential to motivate and mobilize Christians 
against US foreign policy. While there was no single decisive victory for either side in 
this struggle, conservative strategies and critiques heavily influenced the tenor and future 
course of the anti-intervention movement. 
 The conservative stance was broadly one of nationalism; love of God and love of 
the US were one and the same. While the values of Christendom for anti-interventionists 
were focused on protections for the poor and an advocacy for civil rights, viewing US 
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involvement largely as an exercise in imperialism that stood in the way of moral goods, 
the Christian right broadly saw the interests of Christendom as aligned with “American 
political and economic principals” of capitalism, and these principals were to be exported 
globally as a part of their own evangelical mission.149 The Christian right largely saw 
Reagan – with his aggressive foreign policy during the Cold War – as an ally in this 
effort and the Reagan Administration actively courted their support.  
In January 1982, during a meeting with the National Security Council (NSC), 
Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD 17). The directive 
included a commitment to “support democratic forces in Nicaragua” and more broadly to 
commit resources to counter-insurgency efforts across Central America, due in part to 
suspicions of Sandinista involvement in the civil war of El Salvador. As a result of 
NSDD 17, the White House directed the CIA to begin arming and training the Contras, 
who began attacks in Nicaragua later that same year to overthrow and undermine the 
Sandinistas. When the first and second Boland amendments in 1982 and 1983 banned 
such activities, the NSC updated NSDD 17 to include a large-scale information campaign 
to win popular support for the Contra’s activities. A foremost goal of this campaign was 
to portray the “the utter inhumanity and unspeakable cruelties of Marxist guerrillas in 
Central America” and to focus on the Sandinista’s alleged abuses of Christians within the 
region as part of this. The White House then courted conservative religious organizations 
to serve on the frontlines of this information campaign to denounce the Sandinistas and 
assert the irreconcilable nature of revolution, dissent, and Christendom.150 Conservatives 
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were then disposed towards aligning the actions of the Contras and Reagan 
Administration with the will of the Church in common discourse. 
 In many ways, conservative tactics evoked many of the strategies of the anti-
intervention movement, seeking to create ties between the supposed victims of the 
Sandinistas and American Christians much the way groups such as the Maryknoll 
missionaries saw common cause with those who opposed Somoza and sought to connect 
them with sympathetic Christians in the US. Religious leaders could then share the stories 
of those oppressed by the revolution to their own congregations and create a base of 
religious support for US military involvement. In the spring of 1983, the Office of Public 
Liaison began an outreach program wherein they introduced religious leaders and laity 
from many denominations in the US with those allegedly victimized by the regime in 
Nicaragua – including a past editor of La Prensa, a Pentecostal preacher, and even a 
former Maryknoll nun. As part of their outreach program, the Reagan White House 
sought to emphasize divisions among Nicaraguan Christians to portray the popular 
church as controversial. Liberation Theology was not universally accepted in Central 
America; while the revolution was broadly popular among the laity and lower-level 
clergymen, the church hierarchy itself was split. Only half of Nicaragua’s bishops offered 
clear support for the revolutionary government, while the more conservative bishops such 
as Miguel Obando y Bravo actively sought to punish and discipline priests who took 
posts within the Sandinista administration.151 The Sandinista strategy, according to 
witnesses who spoke with conservative leadership, was one of co-optation. They would 
elevate the voices of their allies in the church to create a party line of “true Christianity” 
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while using the arm of the state to torture, oppress, and silence competing visions.152 The 
rightwing critique focused heavily then on delegitimizing Liberation Theology at its core, 
accusing the movement of being a cynical means for Marxist hegemons to seize control 
of religious discourse.  
 A recurring accusation from the Christian right was that the anti-intervention 
movement operated on a “double standard” in a bid to push this co-optation. In her 1979 
essay “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” conservative commentator Jean Kirkpatrick 
of the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) vocally condemned the Carter 
administration for failing to support the Shah in Iran or Somoza in Nicaragua – 
“moderate autocrats” -  on the basis that the rebels taking their place would invariably 
become worse dictators under the directive of the Soviet Union, dismissing the possibility 
that these revolutions were natural processes brought about by mass dissatisfaction with 
the status quo. Instead, she asserted that non-intervention was self-defeating as a foreign 
policy goal and only benefited an aggressive Soviet Union. “The principles of self-
determination and nonintervention are thus both selectively applied. We seem to accept 
the status quo in Communist nations… but not in nations ruled by ‘right-wing’ dictators 
or white oligarchies.” Kirkpatrick explicitly called out socialism as an inherent enemy of 
Christendom but claimed that liberal Christians had been easily “duped” by Marxist 
propagandists who would always turn authoritarian once they gained power.153 Perhaps 
symbolic of the greater struggle over the discourse, Kirkpatrick also maintained an office 
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in Georgetown University as a professor at the time, much the same as Betsy Cohn when 
she operated the Central American Historical Institute.154 
Kirkpatrick’s aggressive tone and rhetoric was especially influential in the Reagan 
Administration’s approach to foreign intervention and the way right-wing critics 
approached Liberation Theology. In a 1984 article on the anti-intervention movement, 
Joan Frawley of the National Catholic Register (writing for the right-wing Heritage 
Foundation) accused liberal and leftwing Christian activists of utilizing civil rights 
concerns as a smokescreen to smear the Reagan administrations “imperfect efforts to 
nurture democratic, anticommunist regimes in Latin America” and frequently invoked the 
accusation of double-standard – accusing organizations such as WOLA of deliberately 
ignoring the abuses of communist governments while critiquing regimes supported by the 
US, such as the dictatorship in El Salvador.155 The human rights violations of said 
regimes were either considered an acceptable evil of anticommunism by Frawley or not 
commented on at all.  
 Proponents of Liberation Theology in Latin America and the US typically 
described it as a “third way” separate from the binary of capitalism and socialism, but 
conservative Christians considered it a cynical communist psy-op.156 While Roberta S. 
Jacobson – later US ambassador to Mexico – noted that forces within Soviet Union 
seemed surprisingly hesitant to directly work with supporters of Liberation Theology, 
right wing critics openly accused the communist power of meddling and manipulating in 
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Catholic affairs.157 In the Nicaraguan context, these accusations rarely allowed for any 
nuance. The Institute on Religion and Democracy (IRD) derided Gustavo Parajon, head 
of CEPAD, as a “loyal Sandinista” and devout Marxist for his organization’s cooperative, 
albeit cautious, relationship with the revolutionary government.158 Some scholars and 
news outlets in the 21st century continue to denounce the entire movement of Liberation 
Theology as a communist invention meant to disrupt legitimate Catholic belief for 
revolutionary ends long after the fact – with Sandinista sympathizers either being 
communist agents or easily-manipulated.159 In 2021 the Catholic News Agency published 
an interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, a KGB defector, wherein he claimed the KGB alone 
invented Liberation Theology to “export communism to Central and South America.”160 
The lingering nature of these conspiracy theories reflects an even more heightened 
hostility towards Liberation Theology at its height in the 1980s. 
The nature of the conflict meant that conservative critics often felt the need to 
tread carefully in their criticism. The Maryknoll Order and Jesuits had long histories in 
the US and beyond and carried good reputations. To outright accuse holy men and 
women of communist sabotage could turn out as poor optics, so many conservative 
Christians opted to paint liberal and left activists as well-meaning but naïve. In the 
conservative Washington Times, Kristen Burroughs described anti-contra protestors on 
the whole as generally good people whose “sound sentiments and good intentions” were 
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manipulated by the Sandinistas to generate positive public relations. They meanwhile 
described Tomas Borge, the Nicaraguan Interior Minister who initially contacted 
Liberation Theologians during the revolution, as a masterful propagandist and alleged 
that he even had a second office filled with crosses, bibles, and family photos to fool 
religious delegations, while his real office was decked out with “Marxist literature and 
posters of Marx, Engels and Lenin” showing his true nature.161  
Attacks from conservative Christians and the Reagan Administration often took a 
gendered approach as well. As the anti-intervention movement drew more women into 
politics, nuns and other missionary women founded the lobby group NETWORK to push 
their vision into reality. NETWORK organized letter-writing campaigns, media efforts, 
and even arranged meetings with members of Congress regarding issues of foreign policy 
and civil rights. Though founded primarily by nuns, they extended membership to all 
who were interested. If Liberation Theology’s effects on religious life already concerned 
conservative commentators, the participation of nuns and lay-women in the movement 
perhaps disturbed them even more. The Wanderer, a Conservative Catholic newspaper, 
condemned the political activities of the Maryknoll Sisters and NETWORK as wasteful 
and heretical, claiming that “more could be done by one Sister in a classroom teaching 
what Catholic social principles truly are, than by the 200 nuns in Washington who have 
only the faintest notion about such principles.”162 The Maryknoll nuns who informed 
much of the anti-Contra protests were painted as unintelligent and uninformed despite 
their experiences on the ground and often described as “hysterical” women whipped into 
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a frenzy by communist propaganda. Politicians such as Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill 
who followed the advice of the nuns were then similarly derided as foolish children 
obediently following the orders of their “stern school marm.”163 To such spectators, 
Maura and her fellow Maryknollers were out of line to have ever left the schoolhouse in 
Siuna. 
US nuns putting themselves at the forefront of the anti-intervention movement 
both in the United States and in Central America itself deeply complicated the Reagan 
Administration’s public relations efforts as well. While they attempted to portray groups 
such as the Contras and the right-wing government of El Salvador as champions of 
human rights against communist aggression, these same groups consistently committed 
acts of extreme violence against US missionary women. When the Miami Herald 
reported on the murder of Sister Maura and her fellow missionaries in El Salvador, they 
spared no details of the gruesome killing, confirming that the women were raped and that 
at least one was rendered unrecognizable due to the bullet put through the back of her 
head. “One’s blue jeans were on backwards, and the bloody underclothing of another lay 
beside the grave.” To further emphasize the uniquely horrific nature of the murder, the 
report included a special note that “the women worried little about their safety in this 
convulsed Central American nation, often saying that blue eyed, blonde North Americans 
were probably the safest people in El Salvador, which is known for treating foreigners 
with great consideration.” They further quoted Maryknoll spokesperson Judy Noone that 
“Evidence provided by reliable sources indicates the military was instrumental in the 
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death and disappearance of these four women.”164 The brutality of US allies even towards 
US nuns proved especially shocking for many onlookers and served to animate mass 
dissatisfaction during this period. 
The White House continued to struggle with the negative publicity of their 
Central American allies in January 1985 when a Contra ambush in Managua resulted in 
the death of 13 civilians and the abduction Maryknoll Sister Nancy Donovan. Showing 
slightly more restraint than their counterparts in El Salvador, the Contras released Nancy 
Donovan after six hours “apparently because she was an American” according to Myriam 
Hooker of the Nicaraguan Embassy. While Donovan was unharmed, the incident 
highlighted the brazen brutality of the Contras, as Donovan confirmed to the press that 
the Contras – labeled “CIA Mercenaries” by Nicaragua’s Ministry of Defense – had yet 
to release any other captive. Some outlets such as the Noblesville Ledger explicitly 
highlighted the similarities between Donovan’s kidnapping and the murder of the four 
nuns in Nicaragua, perhaps indicating that the Contras feared what such an incident 
would do to their public image.165 Donovan went on to denounce US foreign policy 
through outlets such as the Phil Donahue Show, and the Reagan Administration became 
increasingly desperate to change the narrative once again regarding US intervention. This 
included photo-ops with questionable “refugees” that were born in the United States as 
well as a testimony by conservative priest Father Tomas Dowling before congress who 
asserted that “The Contras are overwhelmingly religious.” Though Dowling was 
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introduced as a Catholic priest and wore the associated garb, he was in truth a member of 
“the Old Catholic Church” – a separate sect not associated with the Vatican. He further 
claimed without evidence that the Contras committed no human rights violations and that 
attacks on civilians were in truth false-flag operations carried out by the Sandinistas.166 
These grasps at authenticity revealed a growing frustration with the positive publicity that 
the nuns afforded the anti-intervention movement as well as the negative publicity 
associated with attacks against them. 
 The influence of these nuns and other women over political and moral discourse 
also amplified conservative anxieties that they were losing control over traditional norms. 
Right-wing Catholic media then became especially critical of Vice-Presidential candidate 
Geraldine Ferraro during the 1984 election due to her Catholic Faith. To Cardinal John 
O’Connor of New York, Ferraro’s relatively lax stance on issues such as abortion 
represented a “Modernist rot which infects large segments of the Catholic Church in 
America today. By that I mean she manifests, in a clear and living manner, those 
characteristics which comprise the Modernist heresy.” Reagan and his allies engaged in 
aggressive attacks against Ferraro based on her gender, and during one debate she was 
asked if she felt that the “Soviets might be tempted to try to take advantage of you simply 
because you are a woman?”167 Women such as the Maryknollers were at best hysterical, 
naïve, and incapable of grasping the complexities of foreign policy, or they were at worst 
radical communist dupes promoting heresy and the degradation of the faith. Men such as 
O’Neill who listened to them were childish and unserious as well. In an ironic twist since 
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criticisms of John F. Kennedy’s Catholic faith as a danger to his patriotism, “Good 
Catholics” in the US were suddenly those who followed the Pope’s decrees – which were 
supposedly in lockstep with Reagan’s foreign policy. As the Contra War dragged on, 
appeals to these effects from both the media and White House became ever more 
aggressive. 
Political Responses 
Attacks from conservative politicians often went further to label Liberation 
Theology as an illegitimate brand of Catholicism – a corrupting influence that would 
destroy the faith – and to assert true Catholicism as loyalty to the United States. 
Republican Congressman Henry Hyde openly characterized Liberation Theology as a 
backdoor for communism. Hyde, a self-described true Catholic, bemoaned the “drift of 
the Activist Church…towards the secular Left.”168 Liberation Theology was a wolf-in-
sheep’s-clothing, and anti-Contra protestors were described as uncritical supporters of the 
Sandinistas (and ergo communism). Monks and nuns from orders such as the 
Maryknollers were painted as seditious towards the US and the Vatican simultaneously, 
and conservatives sought to portray the association of Christianity and revolution as 
inherently ridiculous. A 1983 Washington Times article “Preaching Jesus as Guerrilla” 
emphasized that Pope John Paul II was strongly opposed to Liberation Theology and 
included a satirical political cartoon mocking the Maryknollers dubbed “Maryknoll 
Comics Presents: Jesus Christ and the Twelve Insurgents” featuring a fake comic book 
cover portraying Jesus leading an army of guerrillas against the Romans (Figure 4). 
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Nestled in the top left corner was a Soviet sickle and hammer wrapped around a crucifix, 
making the condemnation of the Maryknollers as communist dupes apparent.169 Reagan 
as well freely claimed at the White House’s Conference on Religious Liberty in 1985 that 
the Pope had reached out to personally support his policy in Central America and urged 
him to continue supporting the Contras. The Vatican itself denied any such direct 
endorsement, but the statement spoke to a conservative strategy of trying to delegitimize 
liberal Catholics within the broader church hierarchy.170  
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Figure 4: “Maryknoll Comics Presents” -  The Washington Times 
Reagan’s claims of papal endorsement were not wholly unbelievable. Pope John 
Paul II was notably reticent about Liberation Theology and had personally chided 
Nicaraguan priest Ernesto Cardenal for accepting a post as Minister of Culture in the 
Sandinista government during a March 1983 visit – refusing to let Cardenal kiss his ring 
and instead scolding him with a wag of the finger. Cardenal was stripped of his right to 
perform sacraments when he refused to step down (Figure 5).171 Reagan did not let up on 
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his messaging to Catholic voters either during his 1984 re-election campaign, where he 
spoke at St. Ann’s Festival in Hoboken, New Jersey and emphasized his credentials over 
opponent Walter Mondale on subjects such as abortion, prayers in schools, and a 
reframing of the Central America debate. As Reagan asserted, the communist Sandinistas 
and their “popular church” were an attempt to destroy and replace Catholicism, arguing 
against the legitimacy of Liberation Theology within Christian orthodoxy.172  
 
Figure 5: Cardenal and John Paul II - National Catholic Reporter 
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Conservative critiques of the popular church and Sandinistas became stronger as 
the FSLN became more controversial. The choice to emphasize divisions within 
Nicaraguan Christendom had a basis to build on. While the Sandinistas held a consensus 
early on, this did not last as their own relations with conservative and moderate forces 
faltered without the common enemy of Somoza. An increasingly hostile church hierarchy 
made it even more difficult to maintain their positive reputation. During his 1983 visit to 
Managua, Pope John Paul II was jeered by a crowd at a public mass in Managua after he 
urged the attendees to reject the “popular church” that had aligned with the revolution. 
The crowd of 350,000 strong interrupted with his homilies with cries for “One church on 
the side of the poor!” to which he replied “Silence!” Supposedly, police in attendance and 
Tomas Borge himself egged on the crowd and led the chanting against the pontiff.173 
Reagan did not need to characterize himself solely as a supporter of the Contras to create 
uncertainty among the religious rank-and-file voters but could also emphasize his 
opposition to an increasingly divisive Sandinista government.  
The Reagan Administration further pushed its appeal to a Catholic audience by 
appointing prominent conservative Catholics as spokespeople to act as a buffer between 
itself and activists, such as the Heritage Foundation President Ed Fuelner, conservative 
activist Phyllis Schlafly, and rightwing ideologue William F. Buckley.174 Rather than 
argue against religious criticisms directly, they turned the anti-interventionist struggle 
into an argument over the identity of US Christendom, and characterization of the Reagan 
administration as good servants of God was often effective. While the Hasenfus incident 
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raised public concern over the administration’s illegal sale of arms to Iran to help 
clandestinely fund the Contras, some religious publications suddenly came to the defense 
of Lt. Col. Oliver North, who found himself at the center of the scandal due to his 
involvement with the National Security Council’s illegal activities. A 1987 article from 
the Catholic Advance took focus away from North’s involvement in the arm’s sale to 
instead emphasize his past as a “good student” and an “altar boy,” taking interviews from 
his hometown that focused on his Catholic upbringing and his family’s piety (even as he 
was attending an Episcopal church at the time).175 Auxiliary Bishop Phillip Francis 
Murphy of Baltimore expressed frustration over the support for North at a 1987 press 
conference, where he turned over a statement to Congress asking them to “protect the 
balance of separation of powers” rather than “honor” North’s role in the arms sales by 
avoiding punishment. He characterized North’s actions as “profoundly disturbing” on a 
moral level.176 Support for the antiwar movement was widespread, but it often lacked 
teeth when it mattered the most and the influence of Liberation Theology over US 
Christians was not universal. 
Liberation on the Defensive 
 Conservative Christians successfully put their opponents on the on the defensive 
and muddied the messaging of anti-intervention by emphasizing the wrongdoings of the 
Sandinista government, real or imagined. The brutal nature of the Contra War made this 
especially effective as the Contra’s campaign of sabotage drove the Revolutionary 
 
175 Cited in “Oliver North Remembered As ‘Good Student,’ Altar Boy,” Catholic Advance (Wichita, KA), July 
16, 1987. 
176 Cited in “Religious leaders dismayed by public support for Oliver North,” Catholic Messenger 
(Davenport, IA), July 23, 1987.  
91 
 
government to desperate action. The “Red Christmas” incident of 1981 provided one 
such controversy wherein the Sandinistas forcibly relocated over 8,500 Miskito Indians 
on the Atlantic Coast due to suspicions of collaboration with the counterrevolutionaries. 
In a 2018 essay “Red Christmases” Mateo Cayetano Jarquín notes a split in the literature 
after this incident, wherein activists and historians either portray it as an act of genocide 
by the Sandinistas, or an extreme act of desperation driven by CIA meddling.177 This 
often-forced religious sympathizers on the backfoot as they needed to provide either 
context or justification for such violence. Envío, the regular publication of the Jesuit-run 
IHCA in Managua had this to say on the issue in a March 1982 issue: “The difficulties 
faced on the Coast did not begin with the arrival of the Sandinistas. They are the product 
of 300 years of internal and external colonialism. This legacy of oppression is so deeply a 
part of the people on the Coast that they could not be easily convinced that these new 
“españoles” would treat them any differently than previous rulers.”178 
Incidents such as these provided rightwing critics with a wealth of ammunition to 
portray the FSLN as a dictatorial institution oppressing ethnic and religious minorities. 
While the popular church of Nicaragua itself may not have wanted to replace the Catholic 
Church wholesale, never entirely breaking away from the Church hierarchy, the 
Sandinista government often gave mixed signals in this regard. Conservative critics 
seized on this to attack their rival organizations at the donation box. The IRD waged an 
aggressive campaign to paint the Sandinistas as repressive enemies of the Christian faith, 
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and they similarly attacked their allies in the US as Marxists and frauds. In a 1987 press 
release the IRD accused the protest group “National Mobilization for Justice and Peace in 
Central America and Southern Africa” of misleading the public about their leadership, 
with their ten-person planning committee supposedly only having one church leader 
despite claims of religious endorsements. While the IRD claimed to welcome “healthy 
debate” regarding the issue of US intervention, they derided the protest movement as 
operating under a “false pretense” of mainstream support – painting the movement as 
fringe and deceitful.179  
The IRD continued their attacks with vague reports of “Sandinista crackdowns” 
against religious expression – quoting Tomas Borge’s frustration with Catholic officials 
as evidence of their hostility to religious freedom. Alleged suppression of Archbishop 
Obando y Bravo and the arrest of various Catholic priests and protestant ministers for 
collaborating with Contras were further taken as indicators of their true authoritarian 
nature.180 Their petitions passed to the faithful then accused churches and organizations 
that opposed US intervention of supporting the Sandinistas and warned congregants that 
their donations would be used to back a repressive communist regime, attacking the 
National Council of Churches (NCC) especially due to their ties to the Nicaraguan relief 
group CEPAD, which supposedly distributed Sandinista literature during literacy 
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campaigns of 1980.181 To support the FSLN even indirectly was to endorse 
authoritarianism that would hurt real Christians in Nicaragua, so conservatives urged the 
religious rank-and-file to withhold donations to an activist church hierarchy. In a 1985 
letter to the Bishops of the United Methodist Church, a group of American Methodist 
Missionaries cooperating with CEPAD wrote their own retort accusing the CIA, IRD, and 
similar “interest groups” of acting to deliberately destabilize the situation in Nicaragua 
through media and military means, which necessitated a strong response from President 
Ortega and the Sandinistas as a matter of national security.182 The focus of the letter soon 
shifted back to the struggles and spiritual resilience of the Nicaraguan people, but the 
contents make it clear that the anti-intervention movement now had to contend with 
providing context for often grim wartime activities to the public while simultaneously 
maintaining its critiques of US foreign policy. This made the moral dimension of the 
religious debate much murkier. 
The Vatican itself did not express explicit support for a specific “side” of the 
debate on US intervention, but its condemnations of the Sandinista government added 
fuel to the conservative countermovement as the papacy continued to express disapproval 
of the popular church. In July 1984, the Sandinista government received a harsh 
condemnation from the Vatican for expelling 10 foreign priests from the country, with 
Pope John Paul II claiming their actions were “openly harmful to the church.” Despite the 
pope’s insistence against priests serving as political activists, many onlookers took the 
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statement as a political condemnation of the Sandinista government overall and part of a 
broader campaign against the machinations of the communist Soviet Bloc of Eastern 
Europe.183 
These admonishments extended past the realm of Christianity as well. Rabbis and 
other Jewish activists played a large role in the anti-intervention movement, and as a 
result many right-wing activists charged the Sandinista government with antisemitism in 
hopes of further harming the revolution’s credibility and turning Jewish Americans 
against the anti-contra movement. This talking point was soon picked up by the White 
House, with Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary to the Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, bringing the issue to the fore in a 1984 speech to the United Jewish 
Appeal. Speaking on behalf of President Reagan, who had accused the Sandinistas of 
exiling “virtually the entire Jewish community of Nicaragua”, Abrams condemned the 
Nicaraguan government and its “apologists” which included “some Americans who 
should know better.” Abrams went on to assert that the Sandinistas respected no freedom 
of religion or difference in general, and that antisemitism was entirely consistent with 
their attitudes towards Catholics, Protestants, and “Indians” such as the Miskito.184  
Rabbi Morton Lowenthal of Anti-Defamation League’s Latin American Office 
similarly accused Miguel D’Escoto, Maryknoller and Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, of 
“facile denial” when asked about the topic of antisemitism, followed by total silence. 
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Claims of antisemitism did not go unchallenged however, with Edward Cody of the 
Washington Post foreign service noting that many members of Managua’s Jewish 
community remained in the country even as the League claimed that the “entire Jewish 
community” was forced out. Though Cody noted that the Sandinistas did take ownership 
of a synagogue, he also found that they had offered to return it to its original owners. 
Local Jews such as Jaime Levy – who fled to Nicaragua from France prior to World War 
II – disputed claims of religious persecution and explained there were too few people in 
the community to justify continued ownership of the property.185A 1983 Associated Press 
article further debunked the claim, citing a “confidential” State Department message 
wherein then-ambassador Anthony Quainton informed Secretary of State George Shultz 
that there was no evidence or indication “that the Sandinistas have followed a policy of 
antisemitism or have persecuted Jews solely because of their religion” despite claims 
made by President Reagan and a variety of activist groups.186 Regardless, conservative 
forces within the White House and media continued charges of human right’s violations, 
real and otherwise, in a bid to claim a moral high ground in the broader discourse.  
This also took the form of appropriating liberal and left talking points. One such 
effort focused on the Sanctuary Movement in particular, seeking to change the villain in 
the narrative from US-backed warfare to one of violent Marxists and revolutionaries. 
Many Nicaraguans fled the country following the Sandinista victory, such as Dr. Silvio 
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Arguello who formed the “Nicaraguan Humanitarian Coalition” in Miami to aid the 
settlement of Nicaraguan immigrants and refugees who were struggling to gain 
permission to live and work in the US. Dr. Arguello’s co-chairman was René Molina, 
former member of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Deputies. Most immigrants arriving to the 
US in the revolution’s aftermath were supporters or associates of General Somoza, but as 
the war went on many were young men avoiding being drafted into the Contra War. 
While there were around 140,000 Nicaraguans total in the country, only around 20% had 
explicit work permission, and US conservatives would use these statistics to launch their 
own humanitarian campaign in the vein of the Sanctuary Movement as they entreated the 
Reagan administration to protect those fleeing from Marxist oppression.187 
The non-profit “NEW EXODUS” was one such organization that arose in the 
1980s which sought to realign the language of the Sanctuary Movement. Founded to 
protect those forced into “ex-patriation” their stated goals included studying “The 
phenomenon of refugees in general and particularly those of political and religious 
character.” While their aims implied a broad umbrella, they focused heavily on Central 
America and in particular Nicaragua, republishing articles written on the forced 
relocation of the Miskito tribe and running tracts that centered on the persecutory 
activities of the Sandinistas. One such publication was an interview with Reinaldo Osejo, 
a Nicaraguan refugee who abandoned his home to flee to Costa Rica, where he 
denounced the Sandinistas as an “enslaving government” worse than Somoza before 
giving his endorsement to the Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguense – an opposition 
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party that was challenging the FSLN. While Osejo asserted he was merely expelled from 
Nicaragua for his lack of participation in Sandinista activities, he excitedly endorsed 
counterrevolutionary forces such as the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) that 
was based in San Jose, Costa Rica, and called its leader Eden Pastora “the man of hope 
for Nicaragua.”188 
 By focusing on those displaced by the Sandinistas, supporters of the Reagan 
administration could turn intervention away from a story of US military domination and 
into one of humanitarian aid. Other conservative outlets similarly picked up the religious 
language of “exodus” to describe the situation in Nicaragua, with the Washington Times 
similarly interviewing Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica – many undocumented – for 
their stories of “killing, beatings, and rapes” committed by the Sandinistas much the same 
way liberal and leftwing Christian activists shared the testimonies of refugees fleeing 
from the Contras or death squads in El Salvador. As the Washington Times reported, 
Honduras “has received about 28,000 Nicaraguans” many of whom were among “some 
1,000 Indians from the town of Francia Sirpi…. Protected by 250 warriors and 
accompanied by Catholic Bishop Salvador Schlaefer.”189 The fact that Honduras was 
serving as the base of operations for the Contras was not deemed relevant.190 Nor was the 
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fact that counter-revolutionaries regularly killed religious activists in terrorist attacks and 
targeted Miskitos in resettlement areas for the purposes of terror and abduction, with 
forced recruitment being a common tactic that the Contra forces utilized.191 Turning 
attention away from such incidents allowed right-wing Christians to make the counter-
revolution seem complicated and grey, even as the leadership of the Fuerza Democratica 
Nicaraguense (FDN), the foremost fighting force of the Contras, was primarily built up of 
the same people who had previously supported the Somoza regime as either members of 
the National Guard or part of his secret police.192 
No singular incident, critique, or battle in this holy tug-of-war over the Contra 
War ever produced a singular or clear victory for either faction within US Christendom. 
Anti-interventionist activists and church organizations were always ready to counter the 
claims of their conservative counterparts. When the IRD accused the National Council of 
Churches of supporting oppressive Marxists, their spokesperson Harriet Ziegler was 
ready with a straightforward rebuttal. She clarified that their organization opposed all 
human rights’ violations, and that they had protested communist governments as well in 
the Soviet Union, Poland, and Afghanistan. Communism and capitalism were not the 
point of the antiwar movement – it was rather a “citizen’s responsibility” to speak out 
against the U.S. when it promoted harmful policies overseas. The National Catholic 
Reporter further condemned the IRD’s own double standards when it came to 
denouncing or critiquing US-backed right-wing regimes, which the organization often 
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refused to do. The IRD characterized itself as centrist, but its critics in the National 
Catholic Reporter accused it of following a blind nationalism – “the ethics of Caesar” – 
rather than any coherent or consistent moral code.193  
While these activists never openly capitulated in response to the criticisms from 
Reagan or the IRD, the conservative caricature of the antiwar movement as communist 
sympathy did perhaps temper their critiques of the Contra War in a way that had lasting 
effects. The Christian anti-interventionists grew to distance themselves from the specifics 
of Liberation Theology’s more radical positions and clarified their stance as one of anti-
war, with no stake in the specifics of policy beyond this point. Conservatives effectively 
pushed against the Reagan administration’s foes and revealed the limits of Liberation 
Theology’s influence in the process. Christian activists took a defensive position that left 
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Chapter 4 – End of the Contra War and the Protest Movement 
Liberation with Limits 
Christian activists in the United States were strongly inspired and moved by the 
actions of their counterparts in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s. This caused 
many faithful individuals and groups to fund information networks counter to the State 
Department, take direct action in the form of protest, and break immigration law to 
express solidarity. US Christians had limits though, and the Reagan administration and 
conservative Christians managed to poke and prod at these to find the extent of their 
commitments. Left and Liberal US Christians took on an active ideology of anti-war, 
anti-imperialism, and a willingness to engage in open dissidence, but as the Contra War 
dragged on a squeamishness towards the heightened class consciousness and 
revolutionary rhetoric bound up in Liberation Theology emerged. Perhaps symbolizing a 
defensiveness towards right-wing remarks, Christian activists began distancing 
themselves from the specifics of Latin American politics, merely urging a neutral stance. 
In a 1986 letter to the US senate, the USCCB once again asserted a stance of opposition 
to military force and Contra-aid, but had to clarify opposition to Sandinista abuses of 
certain Catholic officials and wrote:  
 Our opposition to such aid has been unvarying since the question first arose. It is 
not based on our negative assessment of the Contras' human rights record, 
although all are agreed that this continues to be a serious problem. Still less is it 
based on any positive assessment of the human rights performance of the 
Nicaraguan government. Quite the contrary, the USCC has consistently 
denounced specific violations of human rights in Nicaragua and we have 
vigorously protested government infringement of the rights of the Church.194 
 




 In general, US Christians had an aversion towards violence and often 
associations with those potentially tied to violent acts. Daniel Berrigan, an American 
priest and anti-war activist with a long history of civil disobedience and even arrest 
during the Vietnam War, was hesitant to align himself with many Latin American 
counterparts who he felt were too radical.195 In a letter to his brother Phillip in 1978, he 
recalled an incident at a “supper of Unitarians” where he enraged fellow attendee and 
activist Blase Bonpane for his refusal to “support any + all gun wielding Latins, from 
Father [Camilo] Torres, thru Fr. Ernesto [Cardenal], to (get this) ‘Father Fidel.’” Berrigan 
further frustrated Bonpane when he suggested the assembly instead pray for “those in 
prison for nonviolent activity.”196 The Berrigans did not hold open ill-will for their Latin 
American counterparts, and in a 1982 correspondence Phillip described Ernesto Cardenal 
– then the Sandinista Minister of Culture – as being “his typical sweet self” but the 
hesitation displayed an uneasiness with openly endorsing revolutionary rhetoric and 
activity even among some of the most radical US Christian protestors.197 
While many missionaries such as Maura Clark became quite class conscious 
during their time abroad, Liberation Theology’s commitment to social justice in the US 
came to focus on war, which limited the overall scope of the movement. So long as the 
US was not backing militant organizations such as the Contras or deploying troops in the 
region, many religious activists could be satisfied. This not only limited the imagination 
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of the protest movement, but also changed the scope of what the Reagan administration 
and the CIA had to achieve to combat the protest movement long-term. 
One could attribute much of this squeamishness towards revolutionaries to the 
general Red Scare rhetoric that characterized all Cold War discourse, but US Christian 
activists had largely already shown they were not afraid to freely associate with 
“Marxist” revolutionaries such as the Cardenal brothers or Tomas Borge. Another 
explanation for this difference is the differing vectors of politicization between the US 
and Latin America. In the US context, the ideological spread of anti-interventionism was 
relatively diffused. Missionaries such as the Maryknollers returning home from sojourns 
to Central America would share with their families, congregations, and brothers or sisters 
the struggles of the faithful abroad, and these stories and calls to actions were often 
shared through information networks such as WOLA or NACLA as well which 
denounced the activities of the US government and their clients abroad. This was often 
effective for the use of mobilizing the faithful to action – generating mass protests, letter 
writing campaigns, charity drives, and open dissidence in the form of the Sanctuary 
movement – but was limited in terms of its overall ability to generate a larger context. 
These information networks kept readers up to date on current events, but they often did 
not generate a broader critique for the intertwining systems of global capitalism and US 
military domination that provided the motive for US intervention. Direct critiques of 
capitalism were in fact rare among the most widely spread materials of the anti-
intervention movement, which made the overall criticisms of the State Department, CIA, 
and Reagan Administration very much limited to their moment in time. 
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Many in the US found the violence in Nicaragua troubling, but they did not 
necessarily have an attachment to the revolution itself either – warfare and imperialism 
defined the limits of their politicization. While it is questionable how many US Christians 
were converted to Contra-support by the likes of Reagan or the IRD, it is evident that 
Liberation Theology did not convert many regular Christians to fully support 
revolutionaries like the Sandinistas in the way that early missionary-activists did. As 
noted previously, a feature of Liberation Theology exclusive to Latin America was the 
Christian Base Community.198 They served as points of mobilizing and politicizing their 
members – who typically came from poorer communities – so that they could utilize the 
apparatus of the church towards activist ends.199  Even as the popular church began to 
contract in Latin America, members of these CEBs who gained key skills in organization 
and leadership continued to play roles in grassroots activism. Such was the case with 
Elvia Alvarado – a Honduran relief-worker who started work with CEBs and turned to 
labor activism once support from the Catholic hierarchy dried up.200  
While many historians and political analysts felt Liberation Theology was a spent 
force around the turn of the 1990s after the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, it created a 
political awareness that far outlasted its period in the spotlight in Latin America. 
Catholics in the US context lacked these simple units of grassroots politicization, and the 
popular energy of the anti-intervention movement struggled to find purchase among the 
faithful as a result once the Contra War ended. Without a broader critique of power 
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within the United States, the movement ran its course at the turn of the decade. Protecting 
the poor and oppressed meant a protection from physical violence; the economic violence 
of neoliberalism or global capital was not a significant matter of concern. 
Liberation Theology and the Sandinista Defeat 
Catherine Walsh describes decolonial “cracks” as spaces forced open within the 
walls of powerful institutions which can make way for projects that challenge their 
hegemony.201 Nicaragua showcased many of the accomplishments of Liberation 
Theology but also served as a test-case for the limits of pursuing “cracks” in the matrix of 
power. Vatican II and the popular church democratized religious discourse and broke 
down the monopoly the church hierarchy had over theological interpretation, but the 
cracks were not wide enough to upset the existing leadership structures. Discourse was 
democratized, but the actual hierarchy remained closed off to regular people. Nicaragua’s 
popular church was then doomed to fight an uphill battle once the common enemy of 
Somoza disappeared and the “honeymoon” period of the revolution ended.  
While liberation theology enjoyed broad popularity in Latin America, the 
Catholic Hierarchy in Rome was not so receptive to the ideas of Medellín. John Paul II, 
taking the role of Pope in 1978 well after Vatican II, was famously critical of priests who 
participated in the revolution. In 1984, Ernesto Cardenal was punished severely for his 
disobedience, and he was not properly restored as a priest until 2019, just a year before 
his death.202 Conflicts with the broader Catholic hierarchy ultimately revealed the 
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tensions at play within liberation theology. It opened cracks within the structures of the 
Catholic church, but these cracks could be quickly papered over as the movement failed 
to secure power within the institution it was using as its vehicle. As Liberation Theology 
began to struggle for space in Latin America, it would also lose much purchase in North 
America.  
The broader Catholic Church was quite successful in utilizing levers of power to 
silence its more radical members. Over time moderate and conservative church leaders in 
Nicaragua became more brazen in their attempts to undermine the popular church of 
Liberation Theology. Managua Bishop Miguel Obando y Bravo not only demanded that 
priests like Cardenal resign from government positions, but in 1983 also informed Sister 
Pilar Castellanos – a Franciscan nun from Spain – that she would no longer be allowed to 
work in Nicaragua after several years of directing literacy campaigns across the country. 
The IHCA identified this as deliberate attempt to generate controversy and division in 
their publication Envío. They accused conservative forces in the church of trying to 
“destabilize” the nation and paint an image abroad of the Nicaraguan government as a 
“totalitarian” and oppressive institution by removing priests from office and aggrandizing 
conflicts between the Catholic hierarchy and the Sandinistas.203 By doing so, they could 
hurt the image of the revolution to the religious rank-and-file at home and abroad while 
suppressing the voices of popular church leaders, who were becoming increasingly 
dependent on the revolutionary government to broadcast their viewpoints.  
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The Sandinistas had become tainted by the brutal methods they used to fight the 
Contras as well, and many Nicaraguan voters were exhausted by the toll the civil war had 
taken. Ultimately, President Daniel Ortega of the FSLN lost his 1990 reelection bid to 
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of UNO – a 14 party coalition. Chamorro followed her 
victory with a promise to demilitarize the nation after a decade of internal strife, vowing 
to demobilize the Contras and reduce the Sandinista-led army alike.204 In his own 
retrospective on the revolution and civil war, Sandinista economist Alberto Cuenca 
identified this as a “very rational vote by the Nicaraguan people” even as he stood by his 
party’s actions during the 1980s. The decade of brutal fighting had left the populace tired, 
and regardless of how they may have felt about the Sandinista’s policies, they could not 
help but associate them with the decade of violence just as much as they did the 
Contras.205  
The Sandinista loss also left the popular church of Nicaragua – the ambassadors 
of Liberation Theology to the US – without a sponsor to broadcast their voice. 
Relationships between the popular church and Catholic Hierarchy had broken down 
several times over the 1980s, with church leaders repeatedly silencing religious activists 
and undercutting their efforts.206 Chamorro, on the other hand, enjoyed good relations 
with moderate and conservative Catholic leaders such as Archbishop Obando y Bravo, 
who openly supported her candidacy, and Gilberto Aguierre – executive director of the 
Council of Evangelical Churches - predicted she would “give preference to the Catholic 
hierarchy.” Aguierre further remarked that Chomorro’s ties to the conservative Catholic 
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leadership and establishment made him and many other protestants uneasy – fearing new 
rounds of anti-protestant persecutions despite US conservatives accusing the Sandinistas 
of such behavior.207 Nicaragua’s left-wing Christians had tied themselves close to the 
Sandinistas and were now adrift as they had depended on favorable treatment from the 
government to elevate their voices over the traditional church hierarchy. The popular 
church under the Chamorro presidency had none of the backing or resources that they 
enjoyed under the FSLN. 
In this respect, the Reagan administration’s strategies for defeating the Sandinista 
government at the ballot box while deflecting domestic critique were very successful. As 
the Contra War dragged on, it became clear to US intelligence that the guerrillas could 
not overcome the Sandinistas through straightforward combat. They instead opted to 
wear down the populace through attrition to “spread discontent to escalate into active 
protest.”208 Gradually, the Contras were forced to wind down their activities, and in 1989 
agreed to shut down their bases in Honduras after a peace negotiation attended by several 
Central American presidents. The Contras rejected disarmament outright, but their 
dependence on protection from Honduras and weapons/intel from the US meant that their 
days were numbered. Seeing their chances dwindle, the Contras promised to “try” to 
avoid combat until the elections of February 25th, 1990, after which they would assess 
their situation.209 The threat was obvious; if the Sandinistas were to win, they would 
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continue fighting and bloodshed would not stop. From the perspective of many onlookers 
in the US, however, the victory of UNO seemed to be a victory for peace. 
Defeating the FSLN in an ostensibly peaceful manner meant that the movement in 
the United States abruptly lost momentum. While it took nearly 10 years of sabotage and 
terror, the Contras succeeded in ending the Sandinista political project. Christian activists 
in the US meanwhile had repeatedly reaffirmed that they did not support the Sandinistas, 
just that they opposed intervention and imperialism. As they had no critique of 
capitalism, the movement had nowhere else to go into the 1990s. The fact that the 
Sandinistas could lose at all in fact assured onlookers that Nicaraguan democracy had 
succeeded, and it seemed to be a promising “end” of the tumultuous story of the 
Nicaraguan revolution. While the US government had spent an entire decade supporting 
the Contras with guns and chipping away at the Sandinistas bit by bit, the final blow 
appeared bloodless, which satisfied protests for a peaceful solution. 
This dramatically affected the popular church’s following; in 1991 Eric Canin 
noted a turnout of only about 500 attendees at a celebration of the 12th anniversary 
celebration of the Sandinista revolution held in the Jesuit-run Central American 
University. This gathering was mostly attended by members of the city’s CEBs, but the 
celebration had counted 5,000 attendees and ended with a march through the streets a 
mere two years prior, before the electoral loss. As Canin assessed, “the resources and 
enthusiasm for such a gathering no longer existed.” The 1991 celebration was not 
attended by any official representative from the FSLN either, and Sandinista imagery was 
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scrubbed from the proceedings.210 The broader church hierarchy also strategically 
“promoted” certain leftist priests to administrative positions that separated them from 
their community organizations, further sabotaging the movement’s momentum in 
Nicaragua.211 Being cut off from their allies within the FSLN and the US was a 
devastating blow to the influence of Liberation Theology in Nicaragua, and the 
movement on the whole seemed to contract with the turn of “democratization” across the 
region into the 1990s as foreign onlookers lost interest. 
In 1993 the Central American Historical Institute finally shuttered its offices in 
Georgetown University for good.212 Elizabeth Cohn herself had already left the 
organization five years prior in 1988, stating that she felt it had “served its purpose.”213 
Envío, magazine of their Nicaraguan affiliates in the IHCA, noted in 1993 that 
humanitarian aid to Nicaragua seemed to be faltering, even as the Chamorro 
administration boasted the support of foreign governments. As Envío posited, most 
foreign money that entered Nicaragua after the Sandinista defeat went straight into 
paying off the national debt, while less was able to be utilized towards humanitarian ends, 
perhaps implying that religious organizations and charitable NGO’s were losing interest 
in the region.214 The civil war was over, but living conditions continued to worsen as 
social welfare was dramatically cut and the national debt grew with the neoliberal turn of 
the 1990s.215  Also indicative of this growing sense of foreign apathy after the Contra war 
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was the general lack of interest from United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in 
Nicaraguan Affairs. Between 1978 and 1989, the USCCB had penned almost 40 letters 
and statements regarding the political situation of the country. Between 1990-2000, this 
shrunk to 6, with no statements written between 1993 and 2018 at all.216 
Liberation Theology’s effects in the United States were limited to its initial 
vehicle. It came to the US from Nicaragua, and it allowed for a surprising solidarity 
movement among members that pierced the barriers of Cold War ideology but lacked the 
apparatus to fully outlive the context of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Liberation Theology 
reached its crest in US and Nicaragua almost in tandem, but it is difficult to see its 
legacies in the US compared to Central America. The CEBs of Nicaragua are diminished 
but still persist. They are hesitant to use the title “Sandinista” now due to the modern 
abuses of the Ortega regime, but they consider revolution to be an ongoing process that 
began long ago and did not end with victory in 1979 or loss in 1990.217 With few such 
grassroots organizations existing in the United States, the legacies of Liberation Theology 
are harder to trace. Broadly speaking, the anti-intervention movement’s most enduring 
impacts lie outside of its origins within US Christendom. 
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Conclusion: Legacies of Liberation 
While the anti-intervention and anti-contra movement of the 1980s left a legacy, 
much of the religious significance surrounding this legacy has been shed. With no Contra 
War and no serious critique of the neoliberal turn that accompanied the democratization 
of the 1990s in Nicaragua, opposition to US foreign policy in Central America took a 
more secular tone. Without the unity or legitimacy provided by a religious aegis, the 
movement has been scattered to the winds as far as media coverage is concerned, but 
many individuals and groups continue their work diligently. While organizations such as 
CAHI and the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America closed their doors after 
the Contra War, other, larger groups such as WOLA and NACLA have maintained and 
expanded their operations and continue their commitments to peace and social justice.  
The Washington Office on Latin America currently maintains a secular approach 
to activism, but still readily acknowledge the role of religious activism in its formation as 
they identify the 1973 coup in Chile as the impetus for their foundation by an interfaith 
coalition of Church leaders in 1974. Continued support from groups such as the NCC and 
Catholic organizations throughout the 1980s allowed them to expand operations while 
providing a broad audience and basis for legitimacy as they often challenged the US State 
Department and White House.218 In the 2000s WOLA played a major role in founding the 
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) whose investigative 
 
218 “Our History,” Washington Office on Latin America: Advocacy for Human Rights in the Americas, 
https://www.wola.org/history-of-wola/, accessed September 23, 2021.  
112 
 
efforts aided the dismantling of extorsion and money-laundering networks across the 
country through their partnerships with the UN and the Guatemalan Government.219 
The North American Congress on Latin America similarly acknowledges the role 
of religious advocacy groups in granting them their start – noting that they were given 
“free office space in the Presbyterian offices of the Interchurch Center in Uptown 
Manhattan” when they first began their work in the late 1960s. While they now operate 
out of New York University, their goals today remain similar as they seek to combat the 
“sporadic, disorganized, and generally dismal quality” of news about Latin America 
spread by many mainstream media outlets in the United States.220 Not only does NACLA 
continue to cover current events, but they also strive to maintain a clear narrative of Latin 
American history and cover many of the topics their religious counterparts in the 1980s 
failed to seize upon. As early as 1998, NACLA began to address the issues inherent to the 
“neoliberal turn” seen across the Americas during that decade, identifying neoliberalism 
as an ideology “predicated upon forgetting the ideals of social solidarity, equality, and 
justice” in an issue titled “Unearthing Memory.”221 The discourse changed with the 
change of history, but it in no way disappeared.  
Some aspects of the anti-intervention movement also far surpassed the context of 
the Contra War that they emerged from. The Sanctuary Movement remains perhaps the 
longest lasting direct result of the anti-intervention movement. While the religious 
language surrounding the movement slowly went out of fashion, this legacy was 
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remarkably successful in defying US immigration policy. By 1987, 440 US cities had 
declared themselves as “sanctuary cities” and promised to protect Central American 
refugees fleeing civil wars. By 2017 this grew to at least 5 states and at least 644 counties 
according to the John C. Danforth Center on Religion and Politics. The matter of the 
Sanctuary Movement grew to such a pitch that in 2017 Republican President Donald 
Trump signed an executive order criminalizing the concept of sanctuary jurisdictions and 
sought to cut them off from federal funding altogether, which spurred legal challenges 
from jurisdictions in California, Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, and Washington 
state alike.222 According to the ACLU, efforts by the Trump administration and Justice 
Department to punish sanctuary jurisdictions proved largely ineffective by 2018223, and in 
2020 the matter remained largely unchanged.224 
 The legacy also lies beyond political institutions and media outlets and with those 
who took part in protest activities of the 1980s. For many, the anti-intervention 
movement served as their political awakening. Gloria Kinslier, a Sanctuary worker for 
the Southern California Inter-Faith Task Force on Central America (SCITA), found 
political organizing to be personally empowering, recalling that she entered into it 
“straight from being a house-wife. I learned to analyze social struggles in Latin America. 
My work in the Sanctuary movement awakened me as a person.” The interfaith nature of 
the movement in the United States also allowed many Americans activists a deeper 
interaction with those of other religions than they had ever experienced prior. It altered 
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their perspectives on what it meant to be a Christian and a citizen. Whether these activists 
continued to work out of churches or out of universities was not necessarily relevant – 
they had been spurred to action and felt their new calling strongly. Their ability to 
directly interact with counterparts in Central America further allowed them a more 
intimate involvement in their activism that meant few ever fully abandoned their chosen 
cause. Kinsler and her family ultimately moved to Costa Rica in the late 1980s, where 
they worked as guides to religious delegation visiting the region.225 Whether or not they 
remained in the eye of the media or historians, many activists continued their work and 
many of the stories of many of these individuals remain untold as their broader 
movement was dismissed as irrelevant. 
 The language of Liberation Theology has largely faded from public discourse, and 
it currently remains an oddity of history – a curiosity of Latin America in the 1970s and 
the 1980s. To dismiss it as a flash in the pan though overlooks its broader influences. The 
Catholic Church is a global institution that views its teachings as universal. The Vatican’s 
“Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church” proclaims sin to be universal but 
notes that salvation is universal as well. Historically, the universality of the Catholic 
Church’s teachings and its hierarchical structure have served purposes of imperialism, 
sexism, and classism. They have maintained the traditional structures of power and been 
used as a cudgel to justify domination of the strong over the weak – supposed sinners. 
Liberation Theology represented a challenge to the traditional power structures, inverting 
the church’s hierarchies to prioritize the poor and the weak, and its influences were not 
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isolated. “The doctrine of the universality of sin, however, must not be separated from the 
consciousness of the universality of salvation in Jesus Christ.”226 Liberation Theology 
represented a new way to look at faith, and in the United States it represented an 
alternative lens to see through the binaries of the Cold War. 
Scholars and commentators often attribute the rise of conservative Christians in 
US politics to the policies of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s – including his commitments to 
“anticommunism and small government.” True to this, the Reagan administration did 
everything they could to animate religious conservatives at the ballot box and created a 
shift in electoral demographics that conservative politicians in the US still depend 
upon.227 This was not a foregone conclusion, and Christian activists gave Reagan 
numerous challenges to contend with. In some respects, conservative strategies for 
courting religious supports were based on the mass backlash they faced from religious 
activists. Many Christians in the United States saw the changing currents in Latin 
America, and many incorporated these ideas into their own ideology and praxis. The 
Maryknollers took to heart the notion that salvation meant action, and many more 
followed in their footsteps. While this framing has since faded from the broader 
discussion, it is myopic to divorce motives from action merely based on present 
perceptions. The US was not isolated from broader trends across the Americas. Many 
scholars dismiss Liberation Theology as outdated, and it may be, but many still hold the 
precepts of liberation in their hearts, and whether these principles were victorious at their 
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peak does not undercut the effects they have had in the ongoing processes of history 
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